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ABSTRACT
The long-running debate over the propriety and proper scope of
diversity jurisdiction has always centered on the traditional justification 
for diversity jurisdiction: the need to avoid actual or perceived state
court bias against out-of-state parties. Supporters of diversity
jurisdiction assert that such bias continues to justify diversity 
jurisdiction, while opponents argue that it does not. This Article argues
that both sides have it wrong. Supporters are wrong that out-of-state 
bias and its perception are sufficient to justify diversity jurisdiction
today. Yet opponents are wrong that the lack of bias supports the 
abolition or extreme restriction of diversity jurisdiction. The problem 
is the centrality of the bias rationale, which has obscured more pertinent 
considerations in diversity debates. This Article aims to shift the debate 
about diversity jurisdiction away from the bias rationale and toward 
matters relevant to modern litigation, including facilitating multistate 
aggregation. This Article shows that moving beyond bias allows for 
more honest and legitimate debate of the propriety and scope of 
diversity jurisdiction, and it identifies promising areas for diversity
reform in light of that new focus while remaining faithful to the
Constitution. 
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INTRODUCTION
Diversity jurisdiction—the grant of authority to federal courts to
hear state law cases involving parties from different states—is
enshrined in the Constitution and has been granted by statute since the
Judiciary Act of 1789.1 Most jurists accept that the primary and 
1. See Scott Dodson & Philip A. Pucillo, Joint and Several Jurisdiction, 65 DUKE L.J. 1323,
1325 (2016) (stating that diversity jurisdiction “has been a mainstay of federal dockets for more
than two hundred years”). This Article addresses only domestic diversity jurisdiction, not alienage
jurisdiction, which presents unique foreign affairs issues and represents only a tiny fraction of
cases. See Kevin R. Johnson, Why Alienage Jurisdiction? Historical Foundations and Modern
Justifications for Federal Jurisdiction Over Disputes Involving Noncitizens, 21 YALE J. INT’L L. 1,
4–5 & n.19 (1996) (noting that alienage diversity implicates foreign affairs and is an issue in only 
a tiny fraction of cases); Larry Kramer, Diversity Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 97, 121–22 
(same). 
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2019] BEYOND BIAS IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 269
traditional justification for diversity jurisdiction is to provide a neutral 
federal forum in cases presenting a risk that the state forum would be 
biased—or be perceived to be biased—against an out-of-state litigant.2 
This bias rationale has been tethered to diversity jurisdiction since the
Founding Era, when Federalists defended the Diversity Clause on that
ground,3 and it has been repeatedly accepted by the Court to the 
present day.4 The bias rationale has been used to explain the Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the general diversity jurisdiction statute to 
require complete diversity, Congress’s decision to deem corporations 
to be citizens of the state of their principal place of business, and the
removal statute’s bar on removal of diversity cases by in-state 
defendants.5 
Throughout its long history, diversity jurisdiction has always been 
controversial.6 Unsurprisingly in light of its origins, perennial debates 
about diversity jurisdiction’s proper scope have centered around the 
bias rationale.7 Abolitionists seek to eliminate or minimize diversity
jurisdiction on the ground that the bias rationale offers no justification
for diversity jurisdiction today, while diversity jurisdiction supporters 
contend that the bias rationale remains a forceful justification.8 
This Article argues that both sides are wrong. Supporters are 
wrong that the bias rationale continues to justify diversity jurisdiction
today. This is because any evidence of bias is thin and regional; the fear 
of out-of-state bias plays only a minimal role in forum selection; the 
remedy of federal neutrality is suspect; the scope of diversity 
2. See, e.g., Debra Lyn Bassett, The Hidden Bias in Diversity Jurisdiction, 81 WASH. U. L.Q.
119, 119–20 (2003) [hereinafter Bassett, The Hidden Bias] (calling state bias the “traditional, most
common explanation of diversity jurisdiction’s purpose”); Graham C. Lilly, Making Sense of
Nonsense: Reforming Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 IND. L.J. 181, 190 (1998) (referring to state 
bias as the “principal argument for diversity jurisdiction”).
 3. See infra notes 11–71 and accompanying text.
 4. See infra notes 72–84 and accompanying text.
 5. See infra notes 85–107 and accompanying text. 
6. See, e.g., James William Moore & Donald T. Weckstein, Diversity Jurisdiction: Past, 
Present, and Future, 43 TEX. L. REV. 1, 1 (1964) (“While there are other segments of federal
jurisdiction as old as diversity, probably none is as controversial.”); James Bradley Thayer, The 
Case of Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 4 HARV. L. REV. 311, 316 (1891) (“Why is it that a United States
court is given this duty of administering the law of another jurisdiction?”).
 7. See Bassett, The Hidden Bias, supra note 2, at 119 (“Commentators have repeatedly
debated the continued viability of diversity jurisdiction. These debates have tended to focus on . . .
the existence of local bias . . . .”).
 8. See infra notes 108–34 and accompanying text. 
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jurisdiction exceeds any rational cure; and the costs of diversity 
jurisdiction are overwhelming.9 
But opponents are also wrong to suppose that nothing else can
justify diversity jurisdiction. To the contrary, the bias rationale is not 
the only justification—or even the most compelling justification—for 
diversity jurisdiction today. Promoting aggregation across state lines,
in particular, is an important benefit of federal jurisdiction that 
diversity jurisdiction can facilitate. And other benefits of diversity
jurisdiction—such as avoiding other kinds of state biases—also could
justify federal jurisdiction.10 
This Article therefore aims to shift the diversity jurisdiction 
debate away from its myopic focus on out-of-state bias and toward
considerations that are more meaningful for modern civil litigation. 
Scholars, judges, and legislators should recognize that diversity 
jurisdiction can serve important purposes other than protecting against 
state bias toward out-of-state citizens. Of course, there are downsides 
to diversity jurisdiction, and, at the end of the day, it may be that the 
costs of diversity jurisdiction still outweigh its benefits in certain 
instances. But at least the debate would be more honest. And if freed
from the bias rationale, the debate might reveal creative ways to put 
diversity jurisdiction to better use.
Part I of this Article lays out the origins and entrenchment of the
bias rationale, revealing the foundation that has grounded diversity
jurisdiction for more than two centuries. Part II shows how the bias 
rationale has shaped both legal developments and debates about the 
scope of diversity jurisdiction. Part III then confronts the merits of the 
bias rationale and argues, contrary to supporters of diversity
jurisdiction, that the bias rationale is far too weak to justify modern 
diversity jurisdiction. Part IV takes aim at opponents of diversity 
jurisdiction, contending that other considerations—including the 
advantages of interstate aggregation—can bolster the case for diversity 
jurisdiction. With the debate refocused on the concerns of modern civil 
litigation, Part V stakes out areas for more productive diversity
jurisdiction reform and shows that reform measures justified on 
grounds other than the bias rationale would be constitutional. 
9. See infra notes 135–81 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra notes 181–260 and accompanying text.
DODSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2019 3:12 PM       
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I. THE ORIGIN AND ENTRENCHMENT OF THE BIAS RATIONALE
This Part locates the origin of the bias rationale in the drafting and 
ratification of the Constitution and traces its entrenchment through the 
passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789 and subsequent Supreme Court 
opinions. 
A. The Diversity Clause 
Article III of the Constitution extends the judicial power of the
United States to controversies “between Citizens of different States.”11 
The historical record reveals relatively little about the purpose of or 
motivations behind the Diversity Clause; the Framers appeared hardly
to have debated it at all.12 What historical record exists, however, does 
suggest that the Framers were motivated by a fear of state bias against 
out-of-state litigants and resulting interstate discord. 
The Clause had its origins in Edmund Randolph’s Virginia Plan.
All of the plans submitted to the Constitutional Convention provided 
for a federal judiciary, but only the Virginia Plan—which became the
preferred template for discussion—included domestic diversity 
jurisdiction.13 Randolph introduced resolutions on May 29, 1787, to
give lower federal courts jurisdiction in “cases in which foreigners or 
citizens of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be 
11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
 12. See 13E CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3601
(3d ed. 2019) (“Neither the debates of the Constitutional Convention nor the records of the First
Congress shed any substantial light on why diversity jurisdiction was granted to the federal courts
by the Constitution or why the First Congress exercised its option to vest that jurisdiction in the
federal courts.”); John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 13 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 3 (1948) [hereinafter Frank, Historical Bases] (“[T]he judiciary clauses were
almost immune from strenuous criticism or discussion.”); Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483, 484 (1928) [hereinafter Friendly, The Historic Basis]
(“A search of the letters and papers of the [Framers] does not reveal that they had given any large
amount of thought to the construction of a federal judiciary. Certain it is that diversity of
citizenship, as a subject of federal jurisdiction, had not bulked large in their eyes.”).
 13. See Moore & Weckstein, supra note 6, at 2–3 (“[O]nly the plan presented by Governor
Randolph of Virginia specifically included cases in which ‘citizens of other States’ may be
interested.” (citation omitted)); see also Alison L. LaCroix, The Authority for Federalism:
Madison’s Negative and the Origins of Federal Ideology, 28 L. & HIST. REV. 451, 474–78 (2010) 
(discussing the Virginia Plan’s adoption of Madison’s “federal negative” as a way to prevent states
from “thwarting and molesting each other” and the Plan’s embrace of “structural mechanisms
dictating the relationship among different legislative powers”).
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interested.”14 That proposal was tentatively adopted without discussion
on June 4.15 
The following day, however, John Rutledge of South Carolina and 
Roger Sherman of Connecticut moved to amend the provisions to
eliminate all lower federal court jurisdiction on the ground that the 
state courts were sufficient as the sole courts of first instance,16 with the 
Supreme Court providing appellate review.17 James Madison opposed
the motion and, with respect to the elimination of diversity jurisdiction,
argued that appellate review would not remedy biased decisions in
state courts. Nevertheless, the motion carried, 5–4.18 Madison and
James Wilson, not to be cowed, offered an alternative that would 
restore constitutional authorization of lower federal court jurisdiction, 
including diversity jurisdiction, but would also give Congress the 
option not to create lower federal courts at all.19 This compromise
satisfied the delegates and was approved 8–2.20 
On June 13, the Convention amended the resolutions to extend
federal jurisdiction to “questions which involve the national peace and
harmony”21 and reported them to the Committee of Detail.22 Some
have opined that this amendment was not a repudiation of diversity 
jurisdiction but rather a punt to the Committee of Detail to work out 
specifics in light of the general principle of interstate “harmony,” of 
14. James Madison, Resolutions Proposed by Mr. Randolph in Convention (May 29, 1787), 
in 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 20, 22 (Max Farrand ed., 1911).
 15. Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 10. 
16. James Madison, In Committee of the Whole (June 5, 1787), in 1 RECORDS OF THE 
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 119, 124–25.
 17. See James Madison, Friday June 15th. <1787>, in 1 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 244 (providing that the “supreme Tribunal” of the federal
judiciary “shall have authority . . . by way of appeal in the dernier resort in all cases [inter alia] . . .
in which foreigners may be interested”).
18. James Madison, In Committee of the Whole, supra note 16, at 124–25; Frank, Historical
Bases, supra note 12, at 10. 
19. Debates in the Federal Convention of 1787 As Reported by James Madison, in H.R.
Doc. No. 69-398 (1926), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE
UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES 109, 158–59 (Charles C. Tansill ed., 1927).
 20. Id. at 159.
21. James Madison, In Committee of the Whole, supra note 16, at 223–24. For commentary 
on the meaning of the idea of “national harmony,” see generally Jesse M. Cross, National
“Harmony”: An Inter-Branch Constitutional Principle and its Application to Diversity Jurisdiction, 
93 NEB. L. REV. 139 (2014).
22. For more detail about the various discussions and amendments proposed, see
DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF THE FORMATION OF THE UNION OF THE AMERICAN STATES, 
supra note 19, at 198–203.
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which diversity jurisdiction was seen as a part.23 Indeed, drafts 
produced in the Committee of Detail contained specific diversity 
language.24 Subsequently, the Committee produced, and the
Convention accepted without contest, the Diversity Clause.25 
Ratification proved far more contentious than the drafting. The 
Diversity Clause was vehemently attacked during the state ratifying 
conventions.26 Some attacks were part of a more general challenge to 
lower federal court jurisdiction as a whole.27 In Virginia, Patrick Henry
and George Mason predicted that expansive federal court jurisdiction
would destroy state courts. Henry said: 
I see arising out of that paper, a tribunal, that is to be recurred to in 
all cases, when the destruction of the state judiciaries shall happen; 
and from the extensive jurisdiction of these paramount courts, the
state courts must soon be annihilated.28 
Mason echoed that federal jurisdiction would “absorb and destroy 
the judiciaries of the several States”29 and that the federal courts’
“effect and operation will be utterly to destroy the state 
governments.”30 The basic fear of state court displacement was largely 
23. See, e.g., Bassett, The Hidden Bias, supra note 2, at 125–26 (expressing this opinion); 
Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave
New World for Erie and Klaxon, 72 TEX. L. REV. 79, 93 (1993) (same); Friendly, The Historic
Basis, supra note 12, at 485–86 (same); Moore & Weckstein, supra note 6, at 3 (same). 
24. Committee of Detail, in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 
14, at 129, 146–47, 173.
 25. Id. at 146–47, 172–73; James Madison, In Convention (Aug. 6, 1787), in 2 RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 177, 186–87; Journal (Aug 27, 1787), in 2 
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 422, 424–25.  
26. Friendly, The Historic Basis, supra note 12, at 487.
 27. See, e.g., James Madison, In Committee of the Whole, supra note 16, at 119, 125 (Pierce 
Butler) (proclaiming that the establishment of lower federal courts would incite a “revolt”); id. at 
124 (John Rutledge) (calling lower federal courts an “unnecessary encroachment on the 
jurisdiction” of the state courts); id. at 125 (Roger Sherman) (same); James Madison, In
Convention (July 18, 1787), in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 
14, at 40, 45–46 (Luther Martin) (same).
 28. 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION, AS RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT 
PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 542 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d. ed. 1836) [hereinafter ELLIOT’S 
DEBATES]. 
29. George Mason (Sept. 15, 1787), in 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 
supra note 14, at 636, 638. 
30. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 521 (George Mason). These were alarmist
overstatements; even after the passage of the Judiciary Act extending diversity jurisdiction to the
lower federal courts, state courts maintained active dockets. See Friendly, The Historic Basis,
supra note 12, at 489–90 (recounting similar sentiments). 
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274 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:267
caused by diversity jurisdiction, a grant seen as being expansive and
potentially preemptive of state court jurisdiction.31 That fear was 
enough for Mason to declare diversity jurisdiction “improper and
inadmissible.”32 
The Antifederalists also targeted diversity jurisdiction on its own
grounds. Some worried that diversity jurisdiction carried with it an 
implied power by federal courts to make federal law that would
displace state law in such cases.33 Mason pointed to the offensive nature 
of diversity jurisdiction as an affront to the judgment and dignity of
state courts: 
[Federal] jurisdiction further extends to controversies between
citizens of different states. Can we not trust our state courts with the
decision of these? If I have a controversy with a man in Maryland, . . . 
are not the state courts competent to try it? Is it suspected that they
would enforce the payment if unjust, or refuse to enforce it if just?
The very idea is ridiculous.34 
Mason and others raised the logistical difficulties associated with 
travel to potentially distant federal courthouses.35 Mason waxed, 
“What! [C]arry me a thousand miles from home—from my family and 
business—to where, perhaps, it will be impossible to prove that I paid 
it?”36 And in North Carolina, Samuel Spencer stated:
Nothing can be more oppressive than the cognizance with respect to 
controversies between citizens of different states. In all cases of
appeal, those persons who are able to pay had better pay down in the 
31. See The Genuine Information, Delivered to the Legislature of the State of Maryland,
Relative to the Proceedings of the General Convention, Held at Philadelphia, in 1787, by Luther
Martin, Esquire, Attorney General of Maryland, and one of the Delegates in the Said Convention,
in 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 172, 220–21 (“Should a 
citizen of Virginia, Pennsylvania, or any other of the United States, be indebted to, or have debts
due from a citizen of this State [of Massachusetts] . . . it is only in the courts of Congress that
either can apply for redress.”).
 32. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 523 (George Mason).
 33. See Friendly, The Historic Basis, supra note 12, at 490 (noting the Antifederalists’
argument “that since the Constitution and laws made in pursuance thereof were declared to be
the supreme law of the land, the states must bow to this congressional legislation, even in suits
between citizens of the same state in the state courts”).
 34. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 526.  
35. See Friendly, The Historic Basis, supra note 12, at 490 (“The main theme . . . . was rather
that litigation in the new courts would be so expensive and subject to such numerous and costly
appeals that the poor suitor could not obtain justice.”).
 36. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 526.  
DODSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2019 3:12 PM       
  
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
  
  
   
  
 
     
 
 
    
  
 
 
 
 
    
 
  
2019] BEYOND BIAS IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 275
first instance, though it be unjust, than be at such a dreadful expense 
by going such a distance to the Supreme Federal Court.37 
So vocal were these objections that Virginia proposed eliminating
diversity jurisdiction from the Constitution,38 and Massachusetts and 
New Hampshire proposed adding an amount-in-controversy 
requirement.39 
Federalists defended diversity jurisdiction by raising the potential 
for state bias against out-of-state litigants and for the interstate discord 
that might occur as a result. In Virginia, Madison argued:
I sincerely believe this provision will be rather salutary than
otherwise. It may happen that a strong prejudice may arise, in some
states, against the citizens of others, who may have claims against
them. . . . A citizen of another state might not chance to get justice in 
a state court.40 
And Alexander Hamilton, in The Federalist, wrote: 
It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judiciary authority 
of the union ought to extend to these several descriptions of cases. . . 
. [including] all those in which the state tribunals cannot be supposed
to be impartial and unbiased. . . . [Federal courts, by contrast,] having
no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the 
different States and their citizens . . . . The reasonableness of the 
agency of the national courts, in cases in which the state tribunals 
cannot be supposed to be impartial, speaks for itself. No man ought
certainly to be a judge in his own cause, or in any cause in respect to 
which he has the least interest or bias. This principle has no
inconsiderable weight in designating the federal courts, as the proper
37. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 138; see also id. at 143 (M’Dowall of North 
Carolina) (“Can it be supposed that any man, of common circumstances, can stand the expense
and trouble of going from Georgia to Philadelphia, there to have a suit tried?”).
 38. See The Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Virginia on the Adoption
of the Federal Constitution (June 27, 1788), in 3 id. at 660 (proposing a constitutional amendment
that did not list diversity jurisdiction under the United States’ judicial power).
 39. E.g., Debates in the Convention of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution (Feb. 6, 1788), in 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 
177 (proposing amount-in-controversy requirements for the Supreme Court and the federal
courts); 1 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 322, 323, 326 (documenting Massachusetts’s and 
New Hampshire’s ratifications of amount-in-controversy requirements). 
40. 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 533 (James Madison).  
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tribunals for the determination of controversies between different 
states and their citizens.41 
Federalists tied this risk of state bias against out-of-state litigants 
to more substantial risks to the political and economic future of the 
new nation. Hamilton continued:
The power of determining causes . . . between the citizens of different 
states, is . . . essential to the peace of the Union. . . . [I]n order to the 
inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities,
to which the citizens of the union will be entitled, the national 
judiciary ought to preside in all cases, in which one state or its citizens
are opposed to another state or its citizens.42 
In North Carolina, William Davie echoed these concerns: “The 
security of impartiality is the principal reason for giving up the ultimate
decision of controversies between citizens of different states.”43 John 
Marshall of Virginia was more circumspect, arguing that a federal 
forum removed animosity between states that might result from a state
court judgment.44 
The Pennsylvania Federalists made a more economic connection 
to diversity jurisdiction. James Wilson argued that local concerns 
regarding commercial disputes would stymie national economic 
expansion, invoking the merchant whose “property lie[s] at the mercy 
of the laws of Rhode Island” and the creditor “who has his debts at the 
mercy of tender laws in other states.”45 “[I]s it not necessary,” he 
queried, “if we mean to restore either public or private credit, that 
foreigners, as well as ourselves, have a just and impartial tribunal to 
which they may resort?”46 
Despite these rejoinders, the Federalists’ defense of diversity
jurisdiction was less than wholehearted. In Virginia, Madison 
admitted: “As to its cognizance of disputes between citizens of 
different states, I will not say it is a matter of much importance. Perhaps 
it might be left to the state courts.”47 Edmund Pendleton was even 
41. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, at 411, 413–14 (Alexander Hamilton) (George W. Carey &
James McClellan eds., 2001). 
42. Id. at 413.
 43. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 159 (William Richardson Davie).
 44. 3 id. at 557 (Marshall) (arguing that diversity jurisdiction would “preserve the peace of
the Union” by avoiding “disputes between the states”).  
45. 2 id. at 491–92 (Wilson). 
46. Id. at 491.
 47. 3 id. at 533 (James Madison).  
DODSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2019 3:12 PM       
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
 
       
    
  
   
 
 
     
   
  
 
      
  
  
   
 
 
   
  
 
       
   
 
  
2019] BEYOND BIAS IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 277
more deferential: “I think, in general [diversity disputes] might be left 
to the state tribunals; especially as citizens of one state are declared to
be citizens of all. I think it will, in general, be so left by the regulations 
of Congress.”48 And John Marshall distanced himself from the
Diversity Clause: “Were I to contend that this was necessary in all 
cases, and that the government without it would be defective, I should
not use my own judgment.”49 
The debate about the problem of state court bias against out-of-
state litigants was related to an undercurrent of concern involving state 
bias against creditors—specifically, out-of-state creditors. In a famous 
article published in 1928, Henry Friendly argued that the lack of any 
evidence of state court bias against out-of-state litigants at the time,50 
coupled with Federalists’ tepid defense of diversity jurisdiction during 
ratification, suggested that the Diversity Clause was devised primarily
to combat state lawmaking bias against creditors.51 Notwithstanding 
some wrangling over the accuracy of Friendly’s premise that no 
evidence of state court bias existed,52 Friendly has a point.53 Creditor– 
48. Id. at 549 (Edmund Pendleton). 
49. Id. at 556.
 50. Friendly, The Historic Basis, supra note 12, at 493 (noting that “[t]he very form in which 
[Madison’s] argument is stated throws doubts on the sincerity of those propounding it” because 
even “such information as we are able to gather from the reporters entirely fails to show the
existence of prejudice on the part of the state judges”). This is in some contrast to bias against
aliens. See Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 24 (“There can be no doubt, for example, of
direct bias in the administration of justice against British creditors in Virginia.”). But see Kevin 
M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Xenophilia in American Courts, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1120, 
1122 (1996) (“Available data, however, do not support the conclusion that xenophobia is rampant
in American courts.”).
 51. Friendly, The Historic Basis, supra note 12, at 496–97 (“[W]e may say that the desire to 
protect creditors against legislation favorable to debtors was a principal reason for the grant of
diversity jurisdiction . . . .”); see also Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 22, 24–28 
(identifying commercial interests as a basis for diversity jurisdiction). 
52. In 1931, Hessel E. Yntema and George H. Jaffin pointed out that the dearth of evidence
of state bias was explainable by, among other things, the rarity of interstate litigation in the 1700s.
See Hessel E. Yntema & George H. Jaffin, Preliminary Analysis of Concurrent Jurisdiction, 79 U.
PA. L. REV. 869, 875–76 (1931). Some years later, John Frank offered a reconciliation between
Yntema and Jaffin and Friendly, suggesting that although the Founding Era proponents of 
diversity jurisdiction did not have evidence of state bias at the time, they could reasonably predict
that state bias against out-of-state litigants would likely arise as the Union matured. See Frank,
Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 23–27 (“The diversity clauses were based on . . . anticipation 
more largely than on experience.”). 
53. See, e.g., FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME
COURT: A STUDY IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL SYSTEM 9 (1927) (highlighting that even a 
creditor’s subjective evaluation of a court’s impartiality could “undermine[] the sense of security 
necessary for commercial intercourse”); Felix Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power
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debtor relations were a brooding economic, social, and political issue
in the years following the Revolutionary War.54 The Framers did worry
about anticreditor state laws,55 and, at the time, there was significant 
uncertainty about whether federal courts, if granted diversity 
jurisdiction, would have to follow and enforce state commercial laws.56 
But regardless of the true motivations,57 proponents tended to couch
diversity justifications in terms of out-of-state bias, even if that out-of-
state bias was thought to be directed at creditors.58 
Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 520 (1928) (agreeing that
commercial concerns likely played a role in driving diversity jurisdiction).
 54. PETER J. COLEMAN, DEBTORS AND CREDITORS IN AMERICA 115 (1974); MERRILL
JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION
1781–1789, at 303–06 (1950).
 55. 4 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 157 (William Richardson Davie) (accusing states
of passing laws discriminating against out-of-state creditors and supposing that federal courts
might be less inclined to enforce those laws); id. at 159 (William Richardson Davie) (“It is 
necessary, therefore, in order to obtain justice, that we recur to the judiciary of the United States,
where justice must be equally administered, and where a debt may be recovered from the citizen
of one state as soon as from the citizen of another.”); The Virginia Convention (June 20, 1788),
in 10 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1427–28 
(statement of Edmund Pendleton) (defending diversity jurisdiction as a way to combat state
anticreditor laws); 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 14, at 220–21 
(Luther Martin) (“Should a citizen of [any state], be indebted to, or have debts due from a citizen
of this State . . . in consequence of commercial or other transactions, it is only in the courts of
Congress that either can apply for redress.”). Admittedly, the anticreditor bias rationale crossed
over between legislatures and courts. See 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 491 (James
Wilson) (“[I]s it not necessary, if we mean to restore either public or private credit, that
foreigners, as well as ourselves, have a just and impartial tribunal to which they may resort?”). 
56. Compare, e.g., Letter from Agrippa, Mass. Gazette, Dec. 14, 1787, reprinted in 4 THE 
COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 79, 79–80 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981) (arguing that federal law
would control contract claims in diversity cases), with 3 ELLIOT’S DEBATES, supra note 28, at 525– 
26 (Mason) (asserting that state law will control contract claims in diversity cases). Although the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 mandated that the new federal courts at least must apply state statutory law 
in diversity cases, Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, 92 (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 1652 (2018)), the Supreme Court in 1842 held that federal courts sitting in diversity need
not follow state common law. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1, 18 (1842). Swift was famously 
overruled in 1938 by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 77–78 (1938).
57. Robert Jones has offered yet another explanation: that diversity jurisdiction was 
designed to advance national interests by taking important cases away from state-level juries, who 
were often handpicked by local sheriffs, and placing them in federal courts, where federal 
marshals could select nationalist jurors. See generally Robert L. Jones, Finishing a Friendly 
Argument: The Jury and the Historical Origins of Diversity Jurisdiction, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 997 
(2007). 
58. See Barton H. Thompson, Jr., The History of the Judicial Impairment “Doctrine” and Its 
Lessons for the Contract Clause, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1385 (1992) (characterizing debtor
favoritism as a kind of state bias against out-of-staters because the creditors were likely to be out-
of-staters). 
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In the end, although the state conventions did expose divisions 
about the Diversity Clause that stood in contrast to the general
agreement about other grants of lower federal court jurisdiction such
as admiralty,59 those debates were minor when compared to the level 
of controversy over other parts of the proposed Constitution.60 Perhaps
the drafting compromise of leaving the scope of lower court diversity 
jurisdiction to Congress mollified some,61 but it is also likely that more
pressing matters sidelined the Diversity Clause. Nevertheless, the
ratification debates offer the best available evidence of the origins of 
the bias rationale.
B. The Judiciary Act of 1789 
Notwithstanding assurances that Congress would be circumspect 
about granting lower federal court jurisdiction, the First Congress 
quickly passed the Judiciary Act, whose “transcendent achievement”62 
was the establishment of the lower federal courts and the extension of 
diversity jurisdiction to them.63 After all, because the Act did not grant
general federal question jurisdiction to the new lower federal courts,
those courts “would have had very little to do” without diversity 
jurisdiction.64 
One of the Judiciary Act’s primary drafters, Oliver Ellsworth, 
planned to extend diversity jurisdiction to all cases involving citizens of
different states, but the final product was not quite so broad. The initial 
59. Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 9 (“The experience of the Confederation
convinced virtually every conscientious patriot of the 1780’s that the admiralty jurisdiction ought
to be totally, effectively, and completely in the hands of the national government; and an extended
search has not revealed a criticism from any contemporary source of the [grant of] admiralty
jurisdiction.”). 
60. See id. at 3 n.1 (admonishing that the debate about diversity jurisdiction “must be seen
in proportion”). But see Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of
1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 81 (1923) (“There was no part of the Federal jurisdiction which had
sustained so strong an attack from the Anti-Federalists . . . as that which gave them power over
‘controversies between citizens of different States.’”). 
61. See Warren, supra note 60, at 67–68 (explaining that this compromise was struck); 13E
WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3601 (explaining that Article III, Section 2, Clause I of the 
Constitution grants Congress the power to vest diversity jurisdiction in the federal courts, which
it did by passing the Judiciary Act of 1789).
 62. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 53, at 4.
63. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9–13, 1 Stat. 73, 73–78.
 64. HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 141 (1973)
[hereinafter FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION]; see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 97 (“When
the federal courts were created, deciding diversity cases was one of their most important
functions.”).
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draft provided for diversity jurisdiction where a “citizen of another
State than that in which the suit is brought is a party,”65 but the final
version became “[where] the suit is between a citizen of the State where 
the suit is brought, and a citizen of another State.”66 The debate records 
reflect a suggestion to limit diversity jurisdiction to admiralty cases, but 
that suggestion evidently failed to carry the day.67 In addition,
defendants were given the right to remove a case when the defendant 
was an out-of-state citizen sued by an in-state plaintiff.68 
Although the debate records pertaining to the Judiciary Act’s 
grant of diversity jurisdiction are sparse, its language and quick passage 
support the inference that the drafters had the bias rationale in mind.69 
Charles Warren, one of the principal historians of the Judiciary Act, 
wrote: 
The chief and only real reason for this diverse citizenship jurisdiction
was to afford a tribunal in which a foreigner or citizen of another State 
might have the law administered free from the local prejudices or
passions which might prevail in a State Court against foreigners or 
non-citizens. The Federal Court was to secure to a non-citizen the 
application of the same law which a State Court would give to its own 
citizens, and to see that within a State there should be no
discrimination against non-citizens in the application of justice. There 
is not a trace of any other purpose than the above to be found in any
of the arguments made in 1787–1789 as to this jurisdiction.70 
65. Warren, supra note 60, at 77–78. 
66. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. at 78; see also Warren, supra note 60, at 79
(explaining that the original language, in which “neither the plaintiff nor the defendant need be a
citizen of the State where the suit was brought” was “felt to be far too liberal a scope for Federal
jurisdiction”). 
 67. Borchers, supra note 23, at 100–02. 
68. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, at 79; see also Warren, supra note 60, at 90– 
91 (explaining the evolution of § 12 of the Draft Bill).
 69. See Friendly, The Historic Basis, supra note 12, at 501 (asserting that the denial of federal
jurisdiction “where neither party resided in the state where suit was brought” shows that the 
purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to prevent “local prejudice”); Judiciary Act of 1789, NAT’L 
ARCHIVES FOUND., https://www.archivesfoundation.org/documents/judiciary-act-1789
[https://perma.cc/EG9T-AVD2]. Other motivations likely existed, including the promotion of
national power by giving the new federal courts respectable dockets. See AM. LAW. INST., STUDY
OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 49 (1969)
[hereinafter ALI STUDY] (asserting that one of the most important concerns in establishing the 
federal courts was to “enhance[] awareness in the people of the existence of the new and originally
weak central government”).  
70. Warren, supra note 60, at 83.
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2019] BEYOND BIAS IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 281
Though Warren’s conclusion suffers from some hyperbole, it does
reflect the likelihood that the bias rationale was a prime instigator of 
statutory diversity jurisdiction.71 
C. Entrenchment by the Supreme Court 
Whatever the actual motivations of the Framers, the ratifiers, and 
the First Congress, the Supreme Court and prominent commentators 
have entrenched the bias rationale in diversity jurisdiction lore.72 In the 
1809 case of United States v. Deveaux,73 Chief Justice John Marshall 
identified both bias and the risk of bias as targets of diversity
jurisdiction: 
However true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will
administer justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of
every description, it is not less true that the constitution itself either
entertains apprehensions on this subject, or views with such
indulgence the possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has
established national tribunals for the decision of controversies 
between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of different states.74 
Seven years later, Justice Story wrote in Martin v. Hunter’s 
Lessee:75 
The constitution has presumed (whether rightly or wrongly we do not 
inquire) that state attachments, state prejudices, state jealousies, and
state interests, might sometimes obstruct, or control, or be supposed
to obstruct or control, the regular administration of justice. Hence, in 
controversies between . . . citizens of different states . . . it enables the 
parties, under the authority of congress, to have the controversies
heard, tried, and determined before the national tribunals. No other 
reason than that which has been stated can be assigned, why some, at 
71. Those who hoped the federal courts would become a refuge from state anticreditor
legislation would have been disappointed by the Judiciary Act’s inclusion of the Rules of Decision
Act, which mandated that the new federal courts must apply state law in diversity cases. See
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 34, 1 Stat. 73, at 92 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2018)).
 72. See Bassett, The Hidden Bias, supra note 2, at 130–31 (“[T]he ‘local bias’ notion
subsequently has become bound up in, and indeed integral to, the very idea of diversity 
jurisdiction.”); Stephen B. Burbank, The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 in Historical Context:
A Preliminary View, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1439, 1460 (2008) (“Early on, however, the Supreme 
Court embraced [the bias rationale], and the Court has never abandoned it.”).
73. United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
 74. Id. at 87. 
75. Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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least, of those cases should not have been left to the cognizance of the
state courts.76 
The Supreme Court has adhered to these sentiments repeatedly since 
then.77 
And many commentators throughout the ages have also identified 
diversity jurisdiction’s purpose as preventing state bias against out-of-
state litigants. For example, Justice Joseph Story emphasized, in his 
famous Commentaries on the Constitution in 1833, that diversity 
jurisdiction was designed, and was necessary, to forestall the 
expectation that state courts would be biased in favor of in-state 
citizens.78 The great Professors James William Moore and Donald
Weckstein asserted in 1964 that “[t]he traditional view is that diversity 
jurisdiction was established to provide a forum for the determination
of controversies between citizens of different states which would be 
free from local prejudice or influence,”79 and they argued that diversity 
jurisdiction was essential to securing national harmony.80 More
recently, in 2006, Professor Douglas Floyd wrote:
The protection of out-of-state litigants against local bias was the only
justification alluded to by the Framers for Article III’s controversial 
intrusion on the historic jurisdiction of state courts by permitting
76. Id. at 347.
77. For examples, in chronological order, see Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 595, 599
(1855) (“The theory upon which jurisdiction is conferred on the courts of the United States, in
controversies between citizens of different states, has its foundation in the supposition that,
possibly the state tribunal might not be impartial between their own citizens and foreigners.”);
Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 34 (1883) (explaining that diversity jurisdiction was designed “to
institute independent tribunals, which . . . would be unaffected by local prejudices”); Barrow S.S.
Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 111 (1898) (“The object of . . . conferring upon the circuit courts . . .
jurisdiction of controversies between citizens of different States of the Union . . . was to secure a
tribunal presumed to be more impartial than a court of the State in which one of the litigants
resides.”); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 74 (1938) (“Diversity of citizenship jurisdiction
was conferred in order to prevent apprehended discrimination in state courts against those not
citizens of the state.”); Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 111 (1945) (“Diversity jurisdiction
is founded on assurance to non-resident litigants of courts free from susceptibility to potential
local bias.”); and Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 85 (2010) (identifying “diversity jurisdiction’s
basic rationale” as “opening the federal courts’ doors to those who might otherwise suffer from
local prejudice against out-of-state parties”).
 78. See 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
493, 629–31 (1833).
 79. Moore & Weckstein, supra note 6, at 15.
 80. Id. at 18 (“There seems little doubt that the independent national judiciary exercising
jurisdiction over controversies between citizens of different states has been a cohesive force,
during both quiet and tumultuous times, holding this Nation together under the abiding principle
of justice under law.”).
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federal courts to resolve cases turning solely on issues of state law
where litigants were of diverse citizenship. The diversity jurisdiction 
was said to be necessary to ensure the availability of [impartial]
national tribunals . . . .81 
To be clear, academic acceptance of both the origins of the bias 
rationale and its continuing viability is nuanced and adulterated. 
Nevertheless, the bias rationale remains the “stock rationale” for 
diversity jurisdiction82: it is taught in prominent law school casebooks83 
and “continues to serve as a modern-day justification for diversity 
jurisdiction.”84 
II. THE CENTRALITY OF THE BIAS RATIONALE
In light of this history, it is unsurprising that questions and debates
about diversity jurisdiction and its proper scope have focused on the 
policy goal of mitigating state bias—or the perception of bias—against 
out-of-state litigants.85 That is not to say that other justifications for 
81. C. Douglas Floyd, The Inadequacy of the Interstate Commerce Justification for the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2005, 55 EMORY L.J. 487, 500 (2006). 
82. Edward A. Purcell, Jr., The Class Action Fairness Act in Perspective: The Old and the
New in Federal Jurisdictional Reform, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1823, 1847 (2008) [hereinafter Purcell,
The Class Action Fairness Act].
 83. See, e.g., RICHARD D. FREER ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE: CASES, MATERIALS, AND 
QUESTIONS 181 (5th ed. 2008) (“The orthodox view is that diversity jurisdiction provides a neutral
forum . . . . It provides a federal forum for an out-of-state litigant who feared that she might be
the victim of local bias, or be ‘hometowned,’ if forced to litigate before the locally selected state 
court judge.”); JOEL WM. FRIEDMAN & MICHAEL G. COLLINS, THE LAW OF CIVIL PROCEDURE:
CASES AND MATERIALS 186 (3d ed. 2010) (stating that diversity jurisdiction has historically been
based on the idea “that since out-of-staters . . . could be victimized by the ‘home field advantage’
enjoyed by forum citizens, they deserve the opportunity to bring their claims . . . before a federal
judge [who will be] less amenable to local prejudices, pressures, and concerns”); RICHARD L.
MARCUS, MARTIN H. REDISH, EDWARD F. SHERMAN & JAMES E. PFANDER, CIVIL
PROCEDURE: A MODERN APPROACH 869 (7th ed. 2018) (“Although the historical record is
rather thin on the question, Article III apparently provides for diversity and foreign national
jurisdiction to afford a safety valve against state court prejudice against outsiders.”). 
84. David Marcus, Erie, the Class Action Fairness Act, and Some Federalism Implications of
Diversity Jurisdiction, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1247, 1263 (2007). 
85. See Bassett, The Hidden Bias, supra note 2, at 119 (“Commentators have repeatedly
debated the continued viability of diversity jurisdiction. These debates have tended to focus on . . .
the existence of local bias . . . .”); Borchers, supra note 23, at 79 (“The consensus is that diversity
has existed and exists to provide a neutral forum for out-of-staters against perceived local bias by
state courts.”); see also 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3601 (noting “the traditional
explanation, and the one most often cited by federal judges and legal scholars, of the purpose of 
the constitutional provision for diversity of citizenship jurisdiction and its immediate 
congressional implementation—the fear that state courts would be prejudiced against out-of-state 
litigants”). This policy goal is almost always contrasted with the countervailing burden on federal
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diversity jurisdiction have not been proffered.86 But the bias rationale 
is a central feature of defenses of and attacks on diversity jurisdiction, 
shaping both the development of the law and academic debates about
its reform. This Part illustrates some of those key debates. 
A. Legal Developments 
A number of key legal developments showcase the bias rationale’s
relevance to diversity jurisdiction: the complete diversity requirement, 
corporate citizenship, and the forum-defendant bar to removal.87 
caseloads with the inclusion of purely state law cases. See Bassett, The Hidden Bias, supra note 2,
at 119.
86. As for other justifications, some have pointed to biases regarding characteristics other
than state citizenship. See infra notes 224–37 and accompanying text. Others have lauded the
uniformity and familiarity of federal procedures. See Anthony Michael Sabino, Michael A. Sabino
& James N. Sabino, Americold, Diversity Jurisdiction, and Modern Business Entities, 16 J. IN’TL 
BUS. & L. 165, 208 (2017). But cf. Scott Dodson, The Gravitational Force of Federal Law, 164 U.
PA. L. REV. 703, 707–19 (2016) [hereinafter Dodson, Gravitational Force] (arguing that state 
procedure tends to mimic federal procedure). Still others have suggested that federal court
engagement with state law benefits federal courts by keeping them close to their states’ common
law and benefits state law by allowing the pronouncements of the federal courts to provide 
guidance. See John Frank, For Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, 73 YALE L.J. 7, 11–12 (1963)
[hereinafter Frank, Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction]; David L. Shapiro, Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction: A Survey and a Proposal, 91 HARV. L. REV. 317, 322–26 (1977); Carl E. Stewart, 
Diversity Jurisdiction: A Storied Past, a Flexible Future, 63 LOY. L. REV. 207, 226 (2017)
(“[D]iversity cases keep federal judges tied to their state law roots.”). However, the breadth of
federal law and the availability of supplemental jurisdiction appears to offer similar benefits
without the need for diversity jurisdiction and the resulting federalism friction. See Kramer, supra
note 1, at 105, 108 (making this point). Still others suggest that some vertical forum shopping
might be good to create a competitive market and spur the improvement of both state and federal
courts, see Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 
489, 513, 540 (1954), though it is not clear that courts care about docket share in an economic 
sense. Finally, some have suggested that federal courts offer better adjudicative quality, see Moore 
& Weckstein, supra note 6, at 21–22; Shapiro, supra, at 328–29, but the record of federal court
interpretations of state law is decidedly mixed, see Frank Chang, Note, You Have Not Because
You Ask Not: Why Federal Courts Do Not Certify Questions of State Law to State Courts, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 251, 266 (2017) (offering examples of incorrect Erie guesses).
87. Other examples exist, including failed and unworkable attempts to tie diversity
jurisdiction to an actual showing of bias. See  FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE
FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE 40 (1990) (recounting the 1948 elimination of the 
removal requirement of a showing of bias); see also 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3601 
(detailing the role of bias in diversity jurisdiction’s history); Herbert Wechsler, Federal
Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 216, 239–40 (1948). 
An argument can be made that the amount-in-controversy requirement is a proxy for the
identification of controversies whose high value is likely to entice the most bias. Congress has
periodically raised the threshold. See Act of Oct. 19, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-317, § 205, 110 Stat.
3847, 3850 ($75,000); Act of Nov. 19, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-702, 102 Stat. 4642 ($50,000); Act of 
July 25, 1958, § 2, 72 Stat. 415 ($10,000); Judiciary Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat.
1087, 1091 ($3,000); Act of March 3, 1887, chs. 1–2, 24 Stat. 552–53 ($2,000). 
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The first example involves the complete diversity rule. In the 1806
case Strawbridge v. Curtiss,88 the Supreme Court held—or, at least, has 
long been interpreted to have held—that the diversity jurisdiction
statute required complete diversity: that all plaintiffs must have 
citizenships different from all defendants.89 Although Strawbridge does 
not tie its complete diversity rule to state bias, later Court opinions and
academic commentators have reasoned that Strawbridge reflects the
premise that the presence of same-state opponents should neutralize
any out-of-state bias, obviating the need for federal diversity
jurisdiction.90 
The second example involves corporate citizenship, which for 
many years was defined neither in the Constitution nor in the diversity 
statute. In 1844, the Court concluded that corporations were deemed 
citizens, for diversity jurisdiction purposes, solely of their state of 
incorporation.91 Corporations could incorporate in a state without 
doing business in that state, however. And as commerce expanded 
88. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806). 
89. See id. at 267 (“[E]ach distinct interest should be represented by persons, all of whom
are entitled to sue, or may be sued, in the federal courts.”); see also RICHARD H. FALLON, JR.,
JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART & WECHSLER’S FEDERAL 
COURTS 1424 (7th ed. 2015) (questioning the interpretation of Strawbridge but acknowledging 
that “the decision has consistently been interpreted more broadly . . . as requiring ‘complete’
diversity”). 
90. For example, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services., Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005), the
Court noted: 
The Court, nonetheless, has adhered to the complete diversity rule in light of the 
purpose of the diversity requirement, which is to provide a federal forum for important
disputes where state courts might favor, or be perceived as favoring, home-state
litigants. The presence of parties from the same State on both sides of a case dispels
this concern, eliminating a principal reason for conferring § 1332 jurisdiction over any
of the claims in the action.  
Id. at 553–54. See also 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3605 (explaining that “[t]he presumed
theory behind the original grant of diversity jurisdiction . . . was to provide a neutral, national
forum for cases in which there would be a danger of bias in a state court” and that “[t]his
justification . . . does not apply to cases in which there are citizens from the same state on opposing 
sides”); Burbank, supra note 72, at 1460 & n.79 (“In cases kept from federal court by [the
complete diversity rule], a state court intent on disfavoring an out-of-state citizen would also have
to disfavor one of its own.”); David P. Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Institute, 
36 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 18 (1968) (“The assumption apparently underlying Strawbridge is that the
presence of Massachusetts people on both sides of a case will neutralize any possibility of bias
affecting litigants from other states.”).
91. Louisville, Cincinnati & Charleston R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 554 (1844); see 
also Steamship Co. v. Tugman, 106 U.S. 118, 120–21 (1882) (citing Louisville, Cincinnati &
Charleston R.R., 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, for the same legal presumption that a suit by or against a 
corporation is considered a suit by or against citizens of the state whose laws created the
company).
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after the Civil War, corporations increasingly did business in many
states in which they were not incorporated, and thus of which they were 
not considered citizens. In 1928, the Court decided Black & White 
Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,92 
and held that a corporation was a citizen only of its state of 
incorporation even when the corporation did no business there and did 
nearly all of its business in the state where its litigation opponent held
citizenship.93 
Black & White Taxicab raised concern in Congress, which thought 
the Court’s decision was “at odds with diversity jurisdiction’s basic 
rationale, namely, opening the federal courts’ doors to those who might 
otherwise suffer from local prejudice against out-of-state parties,”94 
because a local corporation could incorporate away from its principal 
place of business to take advantage of diversity jurisdiction in the state 
where it was doing most of its business.95 A local corporation suffered
no out-of-state bias, the rationale goes, in its home state of business.
Congress overrode Black & White Taxicab’s “fictional premise that a 
diversity of citizenship exists”96 in 1958 by amending the diversity 
statute to expressly provide that a corporation was a citizen of both its 
state of incorporation and the state of its principal place of business.97 
92. Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276
U.S. 518 (1928). 
93. Id. at 522–25. 
94. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 85 (2010). 
95. See S. REP. NO. 72-530, at 4 (1932) (characterizing corporations’ practice of incorporating 
and doing business in different states as one which “often occurs simply for the purpose of being
able to have the advantage of choosing between two tribunals in case of litigation”). Academic
commentary was similarly negative. See Warren, supra note 60, at 90 (calling the case a “malignant
decision”).
 96. H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 3 (1958); S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 3 (1958), reprinted in 1958
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3099, 3101; see also H.R. REP. NO. 85-1706, at 4; S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4
(“Whatever the effectiveness of this rule, it was never intended to extend to local corporations
which, because of a legal fiction, are considered citizens of another State.”).
97. Act of July 25, 1958, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2018)).
Although Congress used the bias rationale to justify the amendment, Congress may have been
motivated more strongly by curbing the rankest form of corporate forum shopping while still
allowing broad diversity jurisdiction over cases affecting national economic policy. See EDWARD
A. PURCELL, JR., LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY: FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION IN
INDUSTRIAL AMERICA, 1870–1958, at 241 (1992) [hereinafter PURCELL, LITIGATION AND
INEQUALITY] (“In 1958 Congress was not concerned with protecting corporations against the 
dangers of local prejudice but with keeping in the hands of the national courts what it regarded
as in every realistic sense the basic affairs of the nation.”); Burbank, supra note 72, at 1481 n.174 
(agreeing with Purcell and marshalling additional evidence).
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The third example involves the removal process from state to 
federal court. Congress provided for removal of cases in the original 
Judiciary Act of 1789,98 and it persists to this day.99 Congress 
presumably provided for removal of diversity cases to safeguard the 
policies of diversity, namely, “to protect nonresidents from the local 
prejudices of state courts.”100 Consistent with that purpose, the 
Judiciary Act granted a right of removal in nonland domestic cases only 
to out-of-state defendants; in-state defendants could not remove even 
if complete diversity existed.101 Prohibiting in-state defendants from
removing diversity cases from state to federal court was consistent with
the bias rationale, which presumed that the federal forum existed to 
protect out-of-staters from state bias.102 Aside from a brief experiment 
from 1875–1887, when the right of removal was greatly expanded,103 
removal of diversity cases under the general removal statute has always 
been limited to out-of-state defendants.104 This feature of removal is 
additional evidence of the impact of the bias rationale on federal 
diversity jurisdiction.105 
98. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79–80.
99. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441–55 (2018).
 100. 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3721. 
101. Judiciary Act of 1789, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, at 79–80.
 102. See Morris v. Nuzzo, 718 F.3d 660, 665 (7th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he forum defendant rule 
disallows federal removal premised on diversity in cases where the primary rationale for diversity
jurisdiction—to protect defendants against presumed bias of local courts—is not a concern
because at least one defendant is a citizen of the forum state.”); Howard M. Wasserman, A 
Jurisdictional Perspective on New York Times v. Sullivan, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 901, 906 (2013)
(“Diversity jurisdiction exists to counter bias against outsider litigants facing favored local parties
in state court, where judges are often elected or subject to reelection, judges and juries are drawn
locally, and everyone is potentially subject to local popular pressures and passions.”).
 103. Compare Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, 470–71 (authorizing any party 
to remove without regard to residency), with Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 373, §§ 1–2, 24 Stat. 552,
552–53, and Act of Aug. 13, 1888, ch. 866, §§ 1–2, 25 Stat. 433, 433–34 (limiting removal to out-of-
state defendants).
 104. See 14C WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3721 (providing that the current version of the 
section on removal based on diversity of citizenship states: “A civil action otherwise removable
solely on the basis of the jurisdiction under section 1332(a) of this title may not be removed if any 
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the State in which
such action is brought.”). For discussions of the forum-defendant rule, see Scott Dodson, In
Search of Removal Jurisdiction, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 55, 79–88 (2008) (assessing its
jurisdictionality); Scott Dodson, The Forum Defendant Rule in Arkansas, 2007 ARK. L. NOTES
73, 73–81 (offering advice on litigating defects in the forum-defendant rule).
105. The Court also waded into removal in Ex parte Wisner, 203 U.S. 449 (1906), overruled by
Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 260 U.S. 653 (1923). This case held that removal based on 
diversity jurisdiction was barred when all parties were nonresidents, though the case was later
overruled. Id. at 460–61. Although the Court did not ground its decision in the diversity rationale,
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These examples of the bias rationale’s influence on statutory
developments do not mean that the bias rationale has motivated all 
diversity jurisdiction developments. But even when the bias rationale
seems irrelevant to particular statutory acts or reforms,106 reformers
often strive to deploy the bias rationale in their efforts.107 This Article
will have more to say about the distorting effect of the bias rationale in
certain diversity reforms, but, for now, the point is that the bias 
rationale has been and continues to be a central feature in these 
reforms.
B. Academic Commentary 
The perennial “Great Debate”108 among academics about the
propriety and scope of diversity jurisdiction also tends to focus on out-
of-state bias.109 In general, opponents of diversity jurisdiction tend to 
argue that out-of-state bias does not exist or is too muted to support 
diversity jurisdiction, while supporters tend to argue that out-of-state 
bias exists—or the perception of bias exists—and thus demands 
diversity jurisdiction.110 Other arguments, such as federalism, docket 
load, doctrinal complexity, and nonstate biases, do play a role. But the 
out-of-state bias rationale is the perennial focus. Some examples of the 
bias rationale’s widespread influence follow. 
the decision is arguably consistent with it, as Frankfurter pointed out in 1928. See Frankfurter,
supra note 53, at 525–26. 
106. The prominent example of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”) is discussed
below. See infra notes 237–61 and accompanying text. For other examples, see JOANNA
SHEPHERD, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS, ESTIMATING THE IMPACT OF A 
MINIMAL DIVERSITY STANDARD ON FEDERAL COURT CASELOADS 4 (June 2015).
 107. Purcell, The Class Action Fairness Act, supra note 82, at 1834 (noting that it is the bias
rationale’s “amorphous nature” that has “offered jurisdictional reformers a perennial
opportunity”).
 108. Currie, supra note 90, at 4.
 109. 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3601 (“Not surprisingly, the question of what 
purpose is served by diversity jurisdiction has retained its controversial character over the 
years.”). Opponents have been prominent and vocal. See Stewart, supra note 86, at 211 (noting 
that proponents of eliminating diversity jurisdiction have included Chief Justices Warren Burger
and William Rehnquist, as well as several associate justices).
 110. See 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3601 (“Those who favor the retention of 
diversity jurisdiction contend that this prejudice still exists, although perhaps in a diminished
form.”); Kramer, supra note 1, at 119 (“[A]dvocates of diversity jurisdiction argue that bias is a
problem and that it necessitates diversity jurisdiction, and many of their opponents regard this as
the strongest argument for diversity jurisdiction.”); Purcell, The Class Action Fairness Act, supra
note 82, at 1847 (“Advocates of preserving or expanding federal jurisdiction stressed the grave
dangers of ‘bias’ and ‘local prejudice,’ while those who sought to limit or abolish the jurisdiction
minimized or denied these dangers.”).
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In the Erie era, when the rise of federal question litigation began 
putting pressure on federal dockets, diversity skeptics—prominently 
including Justice Felix Frankfurter—argued that the bias rationale was 
essentially defunct: 
Whatever may have been true in the early days of the Union, when 
men felt the strong local patriotism of the politically nouveaux riches, 
has not the time come now to reconsider how justifiable the 
apprehensions [of bias], how valid the fears? The Civil War, the
Spanish War, and the World War have profoundly altered national 
feeling, and the mobility of modern life has greatly weakened state 
attachments. Local prejudice has ever so much less to thrive on than
it did when diversity jurisdiction was written into the Constitution.111 
Diversity supporters, sensing vulnerability, and indeed facing 
Senate bills that would abolish diversity jurisdiction,112 argued that the
bias rationale continued to justify diversity jurisdiction. Judge John 
Parker asserted that the threat of local bias “is as valid today as it was 
in 1787” because “the state trial judge is generally a local man with a
local outlook.”113 Other supporters conceded that bias was less of a
problem than in the 1700s but nevertheless contended that bias was still 
real enough to warrant diversity protection. Robert Brown wrote:
There seems to be no disagreement as to the primary purpose of this
provision for federal jurisdiction based upon diversity of citizenship.
It was to provide, so far as possible, against injury to nonresident 
suitors because of local and sectional prejudice, which would be 
extremely likely to have an important effect in state courts. . . . 
Undoubtedly, such prejudice is weakening, particularly in the 
younger generation, but it is still strong enough to influence the whole 
social fabric, including the local and state courts.”114 
111. Frankfurter, supra note 53, at 521. This argument was not new in the Erie era. See Alfred
Russell, Avoidable Causes of Delay and Uncertainty in Our Courts, 25 AM. L. REV. 776, 795–96 
(1891) (opining that “[h]owever [out-of-state bias] may have been before the whole country was
unified by steam and electricity, and by the result of the Civil War, it is certainly not so now. . . . I
am inclined to the opinion that Congress should abolish this jurisdiction completely”).
 112. See, e.g., S. 4357, 71st Cong., 2d Sess. (1930); Victor Eugene Flango, How Would the
Abolition of Federal Diversity Jurisdiction Affect State Courts?, 74 JUDICATURE 35, 35 (1990)
[hereinafter Flango, How Would Abolition of Diversity Affect State Courts?] (“In 1932, Senator
George Norris of Nebraska introduced a bill to abolish diversity jurisdiction completely.”).
 113. John J. Parker, The Federal Jurisdiction and Recent Attacks upon It, 18 A.B.A. J. 433, 437
(1932). 
114. Robert C. Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of 
Citizenship, 78 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 181–82 (1929); see also, e.g., Gurney E. Newlin, Proposed 
Limitations upon Our Federal Courts, 15 A.B.A. J. 401, 403 (1929) (“While perhaps the danger
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Calls for diversity jurisdiction’s abolition based on the lack of bias 
continued throughout the 1940s and 1950s.115 
In 1959, based on a suggestion from Chief Justice Earl Warren, the 
American Law Institute (“ALI”) commissioned a multiyear, 
comprehensive study of diversity jurisdiction and its future.116 Perhaps 
sensing vulnerability based on the ALI’s study, prominent
commentators vocalized support for diversity jurisdiction. Two of 
diversity jurisdiction’s strongest proponents, James William Moore
and Donald Weckstein, argued that the fear of state bias against out-
of-state litigants continued to justify diversity jurisdiction and, in fact, 
demanded an extension of diversity jurisdiction.117 Some echoed
Moore and Weckstein’s sentiments,118 while others struck a more
moderated tone on bias.119 
of local prejudices or bias has somewhat abated during the past century, yet it has by no means
disappeared to such an extent that it is a negligible factor, in present day affairs.”). The historical
record suggests that these were rote justifications rather than based on evidence, see PURCELL,
LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY, supra note 97, at 129 (“To remove under the [local prejudice] act,
parties had only to submit affidavits stating that they had reason to believe that from prejudice or
local influence they would be unable to obtain justice in the state courts.” (quotations omitted)),
and some contemporaries suggested that diversity supporters were more motivated by the 
procorporate biases of federal court, see George W. Ball, Revision of Federal Diversity
Jurisdiction, 28 ILL. L. REV. 356, 361 n.30 (1933) (citing the opinion that the “feared prejudice [of 
local courts] is not so much against non-residents as it is against corporations”).  
115. See, e.g., Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 59–60 (1954) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring) (calling for abolition); ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE
AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT 37 (Harv. Univ. Press 1955) (same).
 116. See Wednesday Morning Session May 20, 1959, 36 A.L.I. PROC. 27, 34 (1959) (“I would 
hope, Mr. President . . . that the American Law Institute would undertake a special study and
publish a report defining, in the light of modern conditions, the appropriate bases for assigning 
the jurisdiction of Federal and State courts.”).  
117. See Moore & Weckstein, supra note 6, at 16 (“While local prejudices and state jealousies
may be diminishing, it is a fair inference that some litigants still resort to federal courts because 
of apprehensions as to the kind of justice that they will receive in the courts of the state of which
their adversary is a citizen.”); id. at 1 (“We contend that experience and sound future planning 
justify an extension rather than a curtailment of many phases of diversity jurisdiction.”).
 118. See Frank, Maintaining Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 86, at 13 (defending diversity
jurisdiction by suggesting that any hypothetically unmanageable caseload could be addressed by
expanding the number of federal judges).
 119. See Currie, supra note 90, at 5 (explaining his “hunch” that “it is too early to say that
xenophobia has disappeared from the American scene,” but that he could “appreciate the 
argument that the danger of bias is not great enough to justify the burden on federal courts and
the interference with state prerogative that diversity jurisdiction entails”). Currie ultimately
favored abolishing diversity jurisdiction on workability grounds. Id. at 6. For a contrary view, see
Charles Alan Wright, Restructuring Federal Jurisdiction: The American Law Institute Proposals, 
26 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 185, 194–98 (1969) (supporting the ALI proposal, which recommended 
reducing diversity jurisdiction in some ways and expanding it in others). 
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In 1969, the ALI issued a report on its study, which hewed closely
to the bias rationale of diversity jurisdiction and proposed 
corresponding reforms. Its overarching policy was founded on the idea 
that “the function of the jurisdiction is to assure a high level of justice 
to the traveler or visitor from another state” and “to eliminate any real
risk of prejudice against him as a stranger.”120 The report thus
recommended, among other things, excluding in-state plaintiffs from
invoking diversity jurisdiction but allowing federal jurisdiction based 
on incomplete diversity when the risk of prejudice was real.121 
The ALI report did not result in legislative reform. Instead, in the 
1970s, the House passed a bill purporting to eliminate diversity 
jurisdiction entirely on the ground that 
the original reasons for diversity jurisdiction have long since 
disappeared. At present, there is little evidence that the State courts 
are less qualified or, due to latent prejudice against out-of-staters,
unable to render fair and impartial justice in these cases.122 
The bill, however, was defeated in the Senate,123 as were a number 
of other failed bills in the 1970s and 1980s purporting to abolish 
diversity jurisdiction.124 Despite widespread calls for its abolition or 
curtailment during this time,125 diversity jurisdiction’s defenders 
continued to muster support based on the bias rationale.126 
120. ALI STUDY, supra note 69, at 2. For a discussion of the ALI study as it relates to the bias
rationale, see EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION:
ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, AND THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS IN TWENTIETH-
CENTURY AMERICA 278–79 (2000) [hereinafter PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION]. 
121. ALI STUDY, supra note 69, at 3.
 122. ROBERT KASTENMEIER, ABOLITION OF DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION, 
H.R. REP. NO. 95-893, at 3–4 (1978).
123. S. 2389, 95th Cong. (2d Sess. 1978) (providing a bill to, among other things, “abolish 
diversity of citizenship as a basis of jurisdiction of Federal district courts”); H.R. 9622, 95th Cong. 
(2d Sess. 1978) (same). 
124. See, e.g., H.R. 2404, 97th Cong. (1981); S. 2389 & H.R. 9622, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978); 
S. 2094, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978), H.R. 7243, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977). 
125. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 1, at 98 (surveying those calls); Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.,
Abolishing Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potential for Further Reforms, 92
HARV. L. REV. 963 (1979) (offering a thorough critique of diversity jurisdiction and praising the
virtues of abolition). 
126. See, e.g., John P. Frank, The Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, 16 HARV. J. LEGIS. 403, 410
(1979) [hereinafter, Frank, Case for Diversity Jurisdiction] (“[I]nterstate prejudice is not dead
now.”); Charles W. Joiner, Corporations as Citizens of Every State Where They Do Business: A 
Needed Change in Diversity Jurisdiction, 70 JUDICATURE 291, 295 (1987) (arguing, based on the
bias rationale, that corporations should be deemed citizens of each state in which they are 
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292 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:267
The 1990s brought another round of debate. The so-called
“litigation explosion” of the 1970s caused considerable concern about
federal docket overload.127 In 1988, Congress authorized the creation 
of the Federal Courts Study Committee,128 which issued a report in
1990 recommending the near abolition of diversity jurisdiction,
primarily on the ground that local bias was no longer a compelling
justification for diversity jurisdiction.129 The report conceded that the 
threat of bias may exist regionally but that such isolated pockets could 
not justify the cost of diversity jurisdiction.130 That same year, Larry
Kramer, despite acknowledging that, “[o]f the various arguments 
offered in support of diversity jurisdiction, the only credible one is that 
diversity is needed to protect out-of-state litigants from bias,”131 
nevertheless published a powerful critique of diversity jurisdiction.132 
Since this period, the scope of nonclass diversity jurisdiction has 
remained relatively unchanged, despite assaults on the bias rationale
that continue to this day.133 
As with the legal developments in diversity jurisdiction, the 
academic debates about diversity jurisdiction focus on the bias 
rationale. The bias rationale is not, of course, the only point of 
contention in these debates. But its shadow is long and omnipresent, 
both for proponents and opponents of diversity jurisdiction. A notable 
exception is a 1986 article by Professor Tom Rowe and Attorney Ken 
Sibley, which argued for reformed use of diversity jurisdiction in mass-
accident cases but did not reconcile that reformation with the bias
rationale.134 This Article aims to expand upon that narrow proposal,
registered to do business because such corporations have “local business establishments” that
protect them from any local prejudice).
 127. See Arthur R. Miller, The Pretrial Rush to Judgment: Are the “Litigation Explosion,” 
“Liability Crisis,” and Efficiency Clichés Eroding Our Day in Court and Jury Trial Commitments?, 
78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 982, 985–89 (2003) (detailing the “litigation explosion” trope and its effects).
128. Federal Courts Study Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, tit. I, 102 Stat. 4644 (1988).
 129. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 87, at 38–43. 
130. Id. at 40–41 (estimating a cost of $131 million annually, or more than 10 percent of the
federal judicial budget).
 131. Kramer, supra note 1, at 125.
 132. Id. at 99 (“[F]ew other classes of disputes have a weaker claim on federal judicial
resources. . . . Accordingly, Congress should abolish diversity jurisdiction (subject to three 
exceptions . . . ).”). 
133. See Stewart, supra note 86, at 218 (“[S]tate court bias is no longer a viable reason to
justify the need for diversity jurisdiction, if it ever was . . . .”). 
134. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr. & Kenneth D. Sibley, Beyond Diversity: Federal Multiparty,
Multiforum Jurisdiction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 7, 28–29 (1986) (considering caseloads,
administrability, and federalism concerns).
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but the underbrush of the bias rationale must be cleared first. It is to
that task that this Article turns next. 
III. MARGINALIZING THE BIAS RATIONALE
These legal changes and debates discussed previously are deficient
because they overstate the centrality and importance of the bias
rationale. The centrality of the bias rationale to justify diversity 
jurisdiction depends upon real or feared out-of-state bias that
motivates parties to select federal court, which in turn supplies the 
desired neutrality, whose benefits outweigh the costs of diversity
jurisdiction. In reality, the centrality of the bias rationale falters on
each of these analytic steps: (A) studies show that out-of-state bias or 
the perception of out-of-state bias is neither widespread nor
particularly strong; (B) the perception of bias does not often motivate 
parties to invoke diversity jurisdiction; (C) federal court neutrality is 
questionable; (D) diversity jurisdiction’s scope vastly exceeds what is 
necessary to address out-of-state bias; and (E) diversity jurisdiction’s 
costs exceed any remedial value. 
A. Out-of-State Bias is Neither Widespread nor Strong  
In theory, state judges would seem more likely to be swayed by
local prejudices than federal judges because most state judges are
elected or term appointed and are thus accountable to in-state 
powers.135 And empirical evidence shows some connection between 
retention pressures and judicial decision-making.136 But the direction
of the retention pressures is not clear. Although retention pressures 
might induce favoritism toward in-state voters,137 they might also cut 
the other way, particularly if the money driving judicial election 
campaigns comes primarily from out-of-state business interests.138 
135. See generally Scott Dodson, Accountability and Transparency in U.S. Courts, in
GENERAL REPORT ON ACCOUNTABILITY AND TRANSPARENCY (forthcoming 2020) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (assessing the effects of state and federal judicial selection and retention
on accountability and independence).
 136. See id. (manuscript at n.59) (citing several empirical studies on the relationship between
retention pressures and judicial decision-making). 
137. SHEPHERD, supra note 106, at 12.
 138. Cf. James G. Gimpel, Frances E. Lee & Shanna Pearson-Merkowitz, The Check Is in the
Mail: Interdistrict Funding Flows in Congressional Elections, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 373, 374, 377–78 
(2008) (discussing the prevalence of extradistrict campaign funding in congressional elections); 
Joanna M. Shepherd, Money, Politics, and Impartial Justice, 58 DUKE L.J. 623, 670–72 (2009)
(describing the empirical effect of campaign contributions from special interest groups on judicial
elections). 
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Anecdotal reports of actual out-of-state bias are rare and 
isolated.139 Available empirical evidence, though sparse and hard to
come by,140 suggests that the bias rationale has some marginal
substance in that survey data show sporadic perceptions of local bias,141 
but the evidence is mixed.142 
One major difficulty with evidence supporting the bias rationale is 
that out-of-state bias is difficult to isolate from other kinds of bias fears 
that do not necessarily fall across state lines. For example, one study 
that found that although 26 percent of plaintiffs’ lawyers and 51 percent
of defendants’ lawyers perceived local bias against out-of-staters in 
state courts, similar percentages perceived anticorporate biases and 
antirural biases.143 This suggests that other factors that happen to be
correlated with out-of-state status—like corporate or rural status— 
might be driving some of the perceived state court bias against those 
139. In one notable example, Justice Richard Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court once
wrote: 
As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured
in-state plaintiffs, I shall continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give
someone else’s money away, but so is my job security, because the in-state plaintiffs,
their families, and their friends will reelect me.
RICHARD NEELY, THE PRODUCT LIABILITY MESS: HOW BUSINESS CAN BE RESCUED FROM
THE POLITICS OF STATE COURTS 4 (1988); see also Charles L. Brieant, Diversity Jurisdiction: Why 
Does the Bar Talk One Way but Vote the Other Way with Its Feet, N.Y. ST. B.J., July 1989, at 20,
21 (“[A]nyone who believes that there is no local chauvinism in the state courts is hiding his head
somewhere.”).
 140. See Marcus, supra note 84, at 1292 (noting that empirical evidence on local bias is scant,
and that studies of attorneys’ perception of bias are the best available data).
 141. See, e.g., Kristin Bumiller, Choice of Forum in Diversity Cases: Analysis of a Survey and
Implications for Reform, 15 L. & SOC’Y REV. 749, 760 (1980) (noting how 53.3 percent of surveyed
District of South Carolina lawyers, but only 14.6 percent of surveyed Central District of California 
lawyers, ranked fear of out-of-state bias as “important” or “very important”); Jerry Goldman &
Kenneth S. Marks, Diversity Jurisdiction and Local Bias: A Preliminary Empirical Inquiry, 9 J.
LEGAL STUD. 93, 98 (1980) (finding 40 percent of respondents indicated that fear of local bias
“had some bearing” on their forum selection); Neal Miller, An Empirical Study of Forum Choices
in Removal Cases Under Diversity and Federal Question Jurisdiction, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 369, 428
(1992) (noting that 50.7 percent of defense counsel and 26.3 percent of plaintiffs’ attorneys cited
a perception of local bias).
 142. See Jolanta Juszkiewicz Perlstein, Lawyers’ Strategies and Diversity Jurisdiction, 3 L. &
POL’Y Q. 321, 327 (1981) (finding no statistically significant difference in forum selection when
varying information about local bias). Of course, disclosed perception of bias in surveys proves
neither bias nor even, necessarily, actual perception of bias. Cf. Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity
Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. REV. 233, 269 (1988) (noting 
that opinion polls cannot prove anything about actual differences between courts, in commenting
on the issue of courts’ friendliness to constitutional claims).
 143. Miller, supra note 141, at 428.
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parties.144 One study also suggested that local bias could be highly
individualized to particular judges and parties, such as in specific 
judges’ relationships with counsel via prior representation, partnership
at a firm, or political support.145 Another study concluded that even 
out-of-state biases may be more cultural than geographic—a 
Californian might perceive bias in a Mississippi court but an Alabaman 
might not, suggesting that the Californian’s fear of bias is not because
the Californian is non-Mississippian but because the Californian is 
Californian.146 Consistent with these findings, the 1990 Federal Courts 
Study Committee concluded that state bias “does not fall along state 
boundary lines” and that “a greater tension than the tension between
residents and nonresidents is that between urban residents and rural 
residents of the same state or between poor and rich, or between 
individuals and corporations or other institutions, in the same state.”147 
Any perceptions of out-of-state bias also vary greatly by district.148 
One study found fear of local bias was a motivating factor in forum 
selection only in specific forums.149 In particular, bias fears were 
relatively low in the Northeast, Midwest, and Far West, while stronger 
bias fears were reported in the South.150 
The available data thus suggest that actual state bias against out-
of-state parties is extremely rare, that the perception of state bias is 
geographically sporadic and individualized, and that any perception of
bias against out-of-state parties is intertwined with perceptions of bias 
against parties for reasons other than their nonresident status. 
144. See Bumiller, supra note 141, at 762 (finding perceptions of local bias to be driven by 
antirural bias rather than out-of-state bias); Goldman & Marks, supra note 141, at 102–03 (finding
perceptions of local bias to be driven by anticorporate bias rather than out-of-state bias); cf.
Miller, supra note 141, at 428–29 (refuting the contention that bias against out-of-state litigants is
identical to bias against businesses but finding overlap between out-of-state and locality-based 
bias). 
145. See Miller, supra note 141, at 412 (noting that several respondents described perception
of local bias based on previous interactions with certain judges).
 146. See ALI STUDY, supra note 69, at 106–07 (“On the other hand, the bias that was formerly 
thought to operate against out-of-staters as such seems still to exist to some degree with respect 
to persons from a more distant part of the country.”). 
147. FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 87, at 15.
 148. See Shapiro, supra note 86, at 332–39 (reporting on results from a survey sent to federal
district and appellate judges regarding views and time spent on diversity litigation).
 149. See Bumiller, supra note 141, at 760 (comparing survey results from the Eastern District 
of Wisconsin, the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, the District of South Carolina, and the Central
District of California). 
150. Id. at 759–60.
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B. Fear of Out-of-State Bias Does not Strongly Motivate Selection of 
Federal Court 
Fear of out-of-state bias, to the extent it exists, is only a weak 
motivation for invoking diversity jurisdiction. While empirical research 
on the question is limited and somewhat dated, it turns out that a host
of other factors influence forum selection, including the perceived
quality of the court, favorable procedures, and the like.151 In a 1992
survey, only 15 percent of plaintiff and 10 percent of defense attorneys 
identified out-of-state bias as a “very strong” factor in forum 
selection.152 Indeed, the evidence suggests that nearly half of the
diversity cases in federal court are brought by in-state plaintiffs who
ought to be the beneficiaries of local bias in state court.153 The most
important factors appear to be convenience considerations such as 
court familiarity, cost, and bias against corporations.154 Perceived 
competency issues are far more important than bias fears.155 
In short, avoiding out-of-state bias does not seem to strongly 
motivate attorneys to invoke diversity jurisdiction, and even when fear 
is a motivator, other, stronger factors supply the driving force.156 
C. Federal Court Neutrality is Questionable 
For those few cases presenting a real perception of out-of-state 
bias that is strong enough to motivate an invocation of diversity 
jurisdiction, it is not at all clear that federal jurisdiction offers much
151. See id. at 762–64, 768–71. 
152. See Miller, supra note 141, at 408, 429 (noting that 10 percent of defense attorneys said 
bias was a strong reason for removal from state to federal court). 
153. See ALI STUDY, supra note 69, at 1–2, 4–5, 168–72 (noting that nearly half of diversity 
cases are brought by in-state plaintiffs); VICTOR E. FLANGO, NAT’L CTR. FOR ST. CTS., HOW
WOULD PROPOSED CHANGES IN FEDERAL DIVERSITY JURISDICTION AFFECT STATE COURTS? 
76–78 (1989) (noting that 49 percent of diversity cases are brought by in-state plaintiffs); 
ANTHONY PARTRIDGE, THE BUDGETARY IMPACT OF POSSIBLE CHANGES IN DIVERSITY
JURISDICTION 34 (FJC 1988) (noting that 44 percent of diversity cases are brought by in-state
plaintiffs).
 154. See Miller, supra note 141, at 424–25 (detailing these factors in one study). 
155. See id. at 431–34 (discussing the dichotomy between competency concerns and local
litigant bias); Victor E. Flango, Litigant Choice Between State and Federal Courts, 46 S.C. L. REV. 
961, 972–73 (1995) [hereinafter Flango, Litigant Choice] (reporting that more attorneys indicated
that judicial competence and quality were important to forum selection than avoiding out-of-state
bias); see also Stewart, supra note 86, at 218 (“What we can say for certain, however, is that today,
‘state court bias’ is hardly ever a factor in deciding to remove to or file a case in federal district
court.”).
 156. See Flango, Litigant Choice, supra note 155, at 966 (“[L]ocal bias was not a single
consideration affecting forum choice but was one of a combination of attitudes . . . .”).
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protection. Federal judges often come from the same circles as state
judges and have the same local concerns; if any bias against out-of-
staters exists, that bias might be equally held by local federal judges.157 
To the extent the fear of bias is directed at state laws that are biased
against out-of-state parties, the Dormant Commerce Clause 
invalidates such biases that cross constitutional thresholds. Any
remaining disadvantages to out-of-state litigants persist in federal court
because Erie and the Rules of Decision Act demand that those state 
laws apply with the same force in diversity cases.158 Nor are federal 
juries predictably less biased against out-of-state litigants than state 
juries,159 and, in any event, jury trials are astonishingly rare.160 In short,
there is little reason to presume that federal diversity jurisdiction really 
offers any meaningful bulwark against out-of-state bias.
D. Diversity’s Scope Exceeds the Bias Rationale 
Even if marginal perceptions of out-of-state bias were sufficiently 
concerning to require remediation by federal jurisdiction, and even if 
diversity jurisdiction were a reliable solution for those ills, the current
expansiveness of diversity jurisdiction goes far beyond what is required
for that remediation.161 The grant of original diversity jurisdiction, for 
example, allows an in-state plaintiff to invoke federal diversity 
157. See FED. COURTS STUDY COMM., supra note 87, at 15 (noting that federal courts “may 
not be wholly without a bias in favor of local residents”); Bassett, The Hidden Bias, supra note 2,
at 138–39 (“To characterize federal judges as carpetbaggers, unaware of, and insensitive to, local
concerns is thus inaccurate.” (quoting Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV.
1105, 1120 (1977))).
158. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2018); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79–80 (1938). Federal
procedure applies in diversity cases, but state procedure tends to mimic federal procedure, see
Dodson, Gravitational Force, supra note 86 at 707–19, and as for any residual state law differences, 
the author knows of no charge that they are inherently biased against out-of-state litigants.
 159. See ABOLITION OF DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP JURISDICTION, H.R. REP. NO. 95-893, at 
4 (1978) (“Federal juries are now drawn from the same registration or voter lists as State jurors .
. . .”). To the extent federal juries remain more diverse, one commentator has argued, in some
cases, that very diverse federal juries could include more bias than more homogenous state pools.
See Johnson, supra note 1, at 54–55 (making this point with respect to alienage bias).
 160. See Marc Galanter, The Vanishing Trial: An Examination of Trials and Related Matters
in Federal and State Courts, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 459, 463 (2004) (reporting a 1.2 percent
jury-trial rate in federal court in 2002); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the
United States, 122 YALE L.J. 522, 524–25 (2012). 
161. Cf. Bassett, The Hidden Bias, supra note 2, at 131 (arguing that the bias rationale “makes
no sense under several of the scenarios in which diversity jurisdiction can be invoked”). For
examples, see Rodney K. Miller, Article III and Removal Jurisdiction: The Demise of the Complete
Diversity Rule and a Proposed Return to Minimal Diversity, 64 OKLA. L. REV. 269, 272–73 (2012).
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jurisdiction against an out-of-state defendant.162 The statute also allows 
an out-of-state party to invoke diversity jurisdiction even if no in-state 
party is involved, as long as the lineup is completely diverse. 
To illustrate the overbreadth of diversity jurisdiction, consider 
Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel,163 filed in the 
Southern District of New York. The plaintiff, a longtime New York law 
firm that had routinely represented New York clients in New York
state courts, invoked diversity jurisdiction. The defendant, though
formally a resident of Connecticut and later Florida, kept a Manhattan
apartment and had regular business interests in New York. The case
focused on conduct occurring in New York—legal representation in 
New York state courts, no less—and involved New York matrimonial 
law.164 In short, neither party, especially not the plaintiff, was likely to
suffer any bias for being an out-of-state litigant, and the whole case was 
profoundly state law focused. Yet the federal court was forced to hear 
the case under diversity jurisdiction. Such an instance of diversity 
jurisdiction has no role in preventing state bias against out-of-state 
litigants. 
E. Diversity’s Costs Exceed its Remedial Value 
Even if diversity jurisdiction were to reduce bias or the 
appearance of bias in some cases, the costs of diversity jurisdiction as a 
whole overwhelm those limited benefits. One result of expansive 
diversity jurisdiction is that the federal docket load of diversity cases is 
massive and always has been. Records suggest that diversity disputes 
in the early years of the federal judiciary made up a sizable portion of 
the federal dockets.165 Today, diversity cases make up more than 30 
percent of the federal docket.166 Those same cases represent only a tiny
162. See Lumbermen’s Mut. Cas. Co. v. Elbert, 348 U.S. 48, 54 (1954) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring) (critiquing diversity jurisdiction by suggesting that the fear of bias was not truly
justified by experience); Burbank, supra note 72, at 1460 n.79 (stating that the ability of an in-
state plaintiff suing an out-of-state defendant to invoke diversity jurisdiction “is inconsistent with
the traditional account [of the bias rationale]”); Kramer, supra note 1, at 125 (arguing that the
bias rationale “provides no support for allowing in-state plaintiffs to invoke diversity
jurisdiction”).
163. Phillips, Nizer, Benjamin, Krim & Ballon v. Rosenstiel, 490 F.2d 509 (2d Cir. 1973).
 164. Id. at 515.
 165. Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 17–18. 
166. Compare U.S. COURTS, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTICS (2017) (reporting,
in 2017, approximately 32 percent of the federal civil docket as diversity cases), with Kramer,
supra note 1, at 99–100 (reporting around 25–30 percent in the 1970s and 1980s). Approximately
30 percent of diversity cases originate in state courts and are removed to federal court.
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percentage of state dockets,167 a minimal increase in workload that 
some state judges have welcomed.168 
The diversity jurisdiction burden on federal courts, however, has 
meaningful adverse effects on the efficient and effective resolution of 
disputes. Diversity cases demand interpretation and application of 
state substantive law by federal judges less familiar with it than their 
state court counterparts.169 Federal judges presented with an unsettled 
question of state law must choose between making an often difficult 
Erie guess170 and delaying the case by seeking certification from the
state courts.171 When federal courts do decide questions of state law,
those decisions are not precedential and thus deprive the state courts 
of the opportunity to build state law precedent.172 
Even the law of diversity jurisdiction can present intractable
challenges. As Professor Tom Rowe has argued, diversity jurisdiction
raises litigable and often contentious disputes about citizenship, the 
amount in controversy, alignment of parties, joinder, removal, and 
supplemental jurisdiction.173 Diversity cases also require consideration
SHEPHERD, supra note 106, at 21 & n.59; Theodore Eisenberg & Trevor W. Morrison, Overlooked
in the Tort Reform Debate: The Growth of Erroneous Removal, 2 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 
551, 564 (2005).
167. Data analysis from the 1970s and 1990s calculated an increase of only around 1 percent 
to state dockets from abolition of diversity jurisdiction. See Victor E. Flango & Nora F. Blair, The 
Relative Impact of Diversity Cases on State Trial Courts, 2 STATE CT. J., no. 2, Summer 1978, at 
22–23 (“If diversity cases were distributed evenly among the states, each state would experience
an average 1.03 percent increase in civil filings . . . .”); Kramer, supra note 1, at 110–17 (calculating
that complete abolition of diversity jurisdiction would increase state caseloads by around 1
percent and workloads by about 5 percent).
 168. See M. Caldwell Butler, Diversity in the Court System: Let’s Abolish It, 3 ADELPHIA L.J. 
51, 64–65 (1984) (discussing a resolution by the Conference of Chief Justices reporting that state
judges are able and willing to accept diversity cases). 
169. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra note 64, at 141 (making this argument);
Kramer, supra note 1, at 104 (arguing that “state courts have greater expertise and authority”
over state law claims, and thus “diversity jurisdiction forces federal courts to decide issues on
which they have no special expertise at the expense of tasks they can perform significantly better
than state courts”). 
170. See Stewart, supra note 86, at 219–22 (discussing the process by which federal courts are 
required to adjudicate state law cases in federal courts). For a recent state case rejecting a federal
court’s Erie guess, see, for example, Wood v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 505 S.W.3d 542, 544–45
(Tex. 2016).
171. In recent years, the average turnaround time for certification from the Fifth Circuit to
the Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi Supreme Courts has been 482, 215, and 331 days
respectively. Stewart, supra note 86, at 221.
 172. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 104 (“[T]he opinion of a federal court sitting in diversity
does not constitute precedent within the state system.”).
 173. See Rowe, supra note 125, at 969–79 (discussing the contentious nature of the highlighted 
issues in diversity cases); see also Kerry Abrams & Kathryn Barber, Domicile Dismantled, 92 IND.
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of ancillary doctrines like abstention and choice of law.174 It is true that
supplemental jurisdiction still presents these state law problems in 
some federal question cases, but the discretionary nature of 
supplemental jurisdiction allows federal judges to avoid those 
problems in many cases.175 By contrast, the federal diversity caseload, 
which comprises more than 30 percent of the district courts’ private 
civil cases, forces these problems upon federal courts.176 
And all of these features mean that diversity jurisdiction is a major 
distraction of federal court attention away from civil and criminal cases 
arising under federal law.177 Evidence suggests that these complexities 
make diversity cases more demanding and time-consuming—by as 
much as 22 percent—than federal question cases.178 
Further, as Professor Debra Bassett has pointed out, the bias 
rationale may itself promote a bias in the other direction. To the extent
diversity jurisdiction licenses removal of cases from presumptively 
biased state courts, the law stigmatizes those state courts in ways that
are both offensive and counterproductive.179 Worse, the stigmatization
is wholesale: “[W]hen local bias is used in the diversity jurisdiction 
context, it reaches beyond the potential prejudice of one particular 
L.J. 387, 389–90 (2017) (challenging the utility of the citizenship test for individuals). For some 
key cases on these issues, see Americold Realty Trust v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012 
(2016) (unincorporated-entity citizenship); Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 89 (2010)
(corporate citizenship); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005)
(addressing the complexities of supplemental jurisdiction over claims tied to diversity claims); and
Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61 (1996) (curing defects in removal based on diversity
jurisdiction). 
174. See Kramer, supra note 1, at 105–06; Rowe, supra note 125, at 969. For notable cases, 
see, for example, Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516 (1990) (choice of law), Colorado River 
Water Conservation District v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) (abstention), and Louisiana 
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (abstention).
 175. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) (2018) (providing four circumstances under which district courts 
may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction).
 176. See  TABLE C-2—U.S. DISTRICT COURTS–CIVIL STATISTICAL TABLES FOR THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIARY, U.S. CTS. (December 31, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/statistics/table/c-
2/statistical-tables-federal-judiciary/2018/12/31 [https://perma.cc/LT7K-FNBJ] (dividing the total
number of diversity cases (84,496) by the total number of cases in 2018 (278,721) produces 30.32
percent).
 177. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION, supra note 64, at 141 (declaring diversity 
jurisdiction’s “greatest single objection” to be “the diversion of judge-power urgently needed for
tasks which only federal courts can handle or which, because of their expertise, they can handle 
significantly better than the courts of a state”).
 178. See STEVEN FLANDERS, THE 1979 FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT TIME STUDY 15 (1980).
 179. Bassett, The Hidden Bias, supra note 2, at 140. 
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judge and instead paints an entire court system with the broad brush of 
bias.”180 
These costs of diversity jurisdiction are significant; opponents are 
right that the bias rationale cannot justify those costs. 
IV. REFOCUSING THE DEBATE
Abolitionists do not win the debate simply because the bias 
rationale alone cannot support diversity jurisdiction. Diversity 
jurisdiction has much to commend it for other reasons—reasons that 
are often given short shrift when the focus is on the bias rationale.181 
The upshot is that debates about diversity jurisdiction should move 
beyond the bias rationale to consider the full gamut of diversity 
jurisdiction’s virtues and vices. These virtues and vices are often 
overshadowed by the bias rationale or overlooked entirely, but, as this 
Article argues, they are where the debate ought to occur. In that spirit,
this Part explores some of the benefits of diversity jurisdiction outside
of the bias rationale, namely facilitating aggregation and alleviating 
other nonstate biases.
A. Facilitating Aggregation 
Facilitating aggregation is an important justification for diversity 
jurisdiction that has received very little attention in the diversity 
debates182 but that has new agency in light of recent legal 
developments. 
1. Benefits of Aggregation.  The law used to prefer 
individualized litigation for its simplicity because trial was a difficult
and burdensome ordeal.183 As the ratification debates showed, there
were real concerns about the burdens of travel for litigation,184 such
180. Id. at 138.
 181. Cf. 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3601 (“[T]he decision to retain or abolish or
further curtail the statutory basis for this category of federal subject matter jurisdiction must
depend on its utility in contemporary society.”).
182. A notable exception, though one that antedates dramatic changes in recent jurisdictional
law, is Rowe & Sibley, supra note 134 (proposing expanded diversity jurisdiction to provide for
federal court aggregation of certain mass torts). 
183. See Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure in Historical Perspective, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 909, 915–16 (1987) (describing the early 
evolution of writs and substantive law and “rules severely restricting the joinder of plaintiffs and
defendants”).
 184. See supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
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302 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:267
that a lawsuit involving parties from three different states with myriad 
claims among them would have presented significant manageability 
issues. Fortunately, in the antebellum era, most disputes were of the 
simple “A v. B for a cow” variety.185 
Things are quite different today. Commerce is international and 
multifaceted, travel is easy, and litigation is pervasive. The law’s 
perspective on aggregation has evolved as well: the law now favors 
aggregation of claims, parties, and cases because of its efficiency and
fairness benefits to the parties and the system.186 In general, it is far 
more efficient and fair to litigate a thousand similar claims together, 
before a single decision-maker, than independently and perhaps 
scattered across the country.187 
Today’s litigation statistics bear out the benefits of the law’s 
preference for aggregation. As of May 15, 2019, the Joint Panel on
Multidistrict Litigation has consolidated more than 144,000 individual
pending cases into only about two hundred multidistrict litigation 
(“MDL”) proceedings for efficient, aggregated, pretrial proceedings.188 
Class actions, though not as prevalent as they once were, are still the
vehicle of choice for large-scale securities-fraud claims and some
consumer actions involving hundreds of thousands of individual
claimants.189 The alternative to aggregation is frightening, even for 
defendants. Uber, which forced its drivers to sign arbitration
185. Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 26.
 186. See Scott Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 7–16 
(2018) [hereinafter Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation]. For a recent history of
aggregation, see generally Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests: From Representative Actions for
Fair Labor Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U.
PA. L. REV. 1765 (2017). 
187. See Richard D. Freer, Avoiding Duplicative Litigation: Rethinking Plaintiff Autonomy 
and the Court’s Role in Defining the Litigative Unit, 50 U. PITT. L. REV. 809, 813 (1989) (discussing
how “packaging” can eliminate duplicative litigation); Martin H. Redish, Intersystemic
Redundancy and Federal Court Power: Proposing a Zero Tolerance Solution to the Duplicative
Litigation Problem, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1347, 1349 (2000) (same). For an example of some
aggregation successes and some failures, see Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the
United States: Triumph and Failure of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255, 263–66
(2006) (detailing the successes of aggregation for resolving asbestos claims in the early 1990s). 
188. See U.S. JUD. PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT -
DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY DISTRICT, (May 15, 2019)
https://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_District-May-15-
2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/FR22-35XG]. 
189. See Federal Securities Class Action Litigation 1996 – YTD, STAN. L. SCH. SEC. CLASS
ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE, http://securities.stanford.edu/charts.html [https://perma.cc/HF4P-
ZCPK] (reporting that 2017 and 2018 were two of the three highest-filing years for securities class
actions ever). 
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agreements that prevented aggregation, currently faces more than sixty 
thousand independent arbitration demands by individual drivers, many
of whom have similar claims that could otherwise be amenable to 
aggregate treatment.190 Experts conclude that Uber’s cost of resolving 
those disputes as individual arbitrations could exceed $600 million,
vastly more than Uber would need to settle the cases on an aggregated
basis.191 
2. Diversity Jurisdiction and Aggregation. State borders impede 
aggregation by curtailing the reach of state courts and laws. State 
joinder rules can be grudging, and personal jurisdiction limits the
power of a state court to hear disputes involving out-of-state parties.192 
But diversity jurisdiction can enable salutary aggregation in federal 
court that would be forbidden in state court in a number of ways.193 
The Federal Interpleader Act is a prime example.194 Interpleader
is a joinder device that allows a custodian facing multiple competing
claims to the same asset to join the claimants together in a single 
proceeding to determine entitlement to that asset.195 Without 
interpleader, the custodian could be subject to independent actions for 
the same asset, potentially being exposed to duplicative or even 
multiplicative liability.196 
Interpleader depends upon the ability to serve each claimant with
process that will bring them before a court with personal jurisdiction 
over them.197 But that kind of joinder is nearly impossible in state court 
if the claimants are citizens of many different states. This is because the 
Supreme Court’s recent decisions restricting a state court’s personal 
jurisdiction over out-of-state litigants will likely impede a state court’s 
190. Joel Rosenblatt, Uber Gambled on Driver Arbitration and Might Have Come Up the 
Loser, L.A. TIMES (May 8, 2019, 10:22 AM), https://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-uber-ipo-
arbitration-miscalculation-20190508-story.html [https://perma.cc/W4VQ-JBKL].
 191. Id.
 192. See Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, supra note 186, at 35–45. 
193. See generally Rowe & Sibley, supra note 134 (making this argument to propose a 
precursor to the Multiparty, Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002).
194. Act of Feb. 22, 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1335
(2018)). For a history, see 7 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 1701.
 195. See Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Interpleader in the United States Courts, 41 YALE L.J. 1134, 
1134–35 (1932) (discussing the benefits of interpleader in U.S. courts).
 196. See id. For an example of such a situation, see New York Life Insurance Co. v. Dunlevy, 
241 U.S. 518 (1916). 
197. See Chafee, supra note 195, at 1136 (“[A]n interpleader suit will not give complete relief
to the stakeholder unless the entire controversy can be settled in the interpleader proceeding.”).
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ability to hale many claimants—who will be considered defendants in
an interpleader action—into the action.198 
Diversity jurisdiction saves the day. The Federal Interpleader Act 
grants federal courts diversity jurisdiction to hear interpleader actions 
based on state law.199 To ensure maximum opportunity for joinder of
claimants, the Act requires only minimal diversity and a de minimis 
amount in controversy.200 Further, Congress gave the federal courts a
nationwide range for service of process in interpleader actions,201 thus 
ensuring that all claimants anywhere in the United States could be 
brought before the single interpleader proceeding. Through the 
Federal Interpleader Act, diversity jurisdiction provides for a salutary 
aggregation that could not be accomplished in state court.202 Notably, 
the bias rationale offers no compelling rationale for diversity
jurisdiction in interpleader; rather, the overriding benefit is simply 
aggregation.
198. See Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court, 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1780 (2017) (insisting
on a connection between the claim and the state); Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285–86 (2014)
(insisting on a connection between the defendant and the state). For a detailed discussion of
personal jurisdiction limits in the context of multistate joinder and interpleader, see Dodson,
Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, supra note 186, at 19–45. For a prediction that personal
jurisdiction limits are likely to continue for the foreseeable future, see Scott Dodson, Jurisdiction 
in the Trump Era, 87 FORDHAM L. REV. 73, 74–78, 83–84 (2018) [hereinafter Dodson, Jurisdiction
in the Trump Era].
199. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2018).
 200. Id. § 1335(a)(1) (requiring only “[t]wo or more adverse claimants, of diverse citizenship”
and an amount in controversy exceeding $500); see also State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 
386 U.S. 523, 533 (1967) (confirming the requirement of only minimal diversity). Professor Jim 
Pfander raises the possibility that Tashire might be read as upholding the Interpleader Act on
ancillary jurisdiction grounds rather than minimal diversity grounds. James E. Pfander, Protective
Jurisdiction, Aggregate Litigation, and the Limits of Article III, 95 CALIF. L. REV. 1423, 1453–54
(2007). 
201. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 provides:
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader under section 1335 of
this title, a district court may issue its process for all claimants and enter its order 
restraining them from instituting or prosecuting any proceeding in any State or United
States court affecting the property, instrument or obligation involved in the 
interpleader action until further order of the court. Such process and order shall be . . .
addressed to and served by the United States marshals for the respective districts where
the claimants reside or may be found.
 202. See 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3601 (“[Interpleader] is a convenient means of
providing a federal forum for cases over which no state court might be able to obtain
jurisdiction.”); see also Kramer, supra note 1, at 123 (“[C]ommentators unanimously agree that
the federal courts provide a service in [interpleader] cases that state courts may not be able
adequately to provide.”). 
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Interpleader is not a unique aberration. The Multiparty, 
Multiforum Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 (“MMTJA”),203 the Y2K Act
of 1999,204 and even the supplemental jurisdiction statute205 all use
diversity jurisdiction to promote aggregation even when the bias 
rationale is not seriously implicated. The MMTJA and Y2K Act both
grant minimal diversity jurisdiction and nationwide personal 
jurisdiction for purposes of facilitating aggregation.206 And the 
supplemental jurisdiction statute allows joinder of certain nondiverse 
state claims that might not be able to be joined in state court.207 
Diversity jurisdiction also promotes aggregation through class 
actions. State class action laws can differ from Rule 23, the class action
rule that applies in federal court.208 Many state laws, for example, bar 
class actions entirely or for certain claims and kinds of relief.209 Rule
23, however, has no claim restrictions; it applies with full force in 
federal court even when based upon state claims that would be 
precluded from representative litigation under a state class action
rule.210 
Diversity jurisdiction enables those representative actions, which 
might be barred in state court, to be pursued under the federal class 
action rule in federal court. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
(“CAFA”) grants federal diversity jurisdiction to certain class actions 
203. 28 U.S.C. § 1369.
204. Y2K Act, Pub. L. No. 106-37, § 15(c)(2), 113 Stat. 185, 201 (1999) (codified at 15 USC 
§ 6614).
205. 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
 206. See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 107-685, at 200 (2002) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 2002
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1120, 1152 (citing a “waste of judicial resources—and the costs to both plaintiffs
and defendants—of litigating the same liability question several times over in separate lawsuits”).
 207. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (extending diversity jurisdiction to a related state impleader claim
brought by an out-of-state defendant against a same-state third party); cf.  FED. R. CIV. P.
4(k)(1)(B) (authorizing service of process on an impleaded party outside of the forum state if
served within one hundred miles of the courthouse).
 208. See generally  THE LAW OF CLASS ACTION: FIFTY-STATE SURVEY 2019 (ABA 2019)
(describing all fifty states’ laws on class actions).
209. For example, the Georgia Code provides that
Any person who suffers injury or damages as a result of a violation of Chapter 5B of 
this title, as a result of consumer acts or practices in violation of this part, as a result of
office supply transactions in violation of this part or whose business or property has
been injured or damaged as a result of such violations may bring an action individually, 
but not in a representative capacity . . . .
 GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-399(a) (2015). See also Falis v. Jefferson Davis Cty. Pub. Sch. Bd., 95 So. 
3d 1223, 1227 (Miss. 2012) (Dickinson, J., dissenting) (“[I]n Mississippi, there are no class
actions.”).  
210. See Shady Grove Orthopedic Assocs., P.A. v. Allstate Ins., 559 U.S. 393, 399–400 (2010) 
(holding that Rule 23 controls over a New York state rule precluding certain class action claims). 
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based on minimal diversity.211 And even ordinary class actions can meet 
the complete diversity requirement if the class proffers representatives
who are completely diverse.212 Because of the Supreme Court’s 
restrictive application of personal jurisdiction doctrine, most class 
actions will be pursued in the defendant’s home state.213 But under 
these circumstances—in which the class would be severely hampered 
by state class action law if confined to state court—the invocation of 
the federal forum is almost certainly motivated by aggregation, not the 
alleviation of out-of-state bias.214 
Perhaps the broadest diversity-based aggregation device is MDL. 
The Multidistrict Litigation Act215 was intended as the primary
mechanism for aggregating state law mass tort cases.216 With class 
actions in decline, MDLs are on the rise and offer tremendous 
efficiencies and savings for both parties and courts in consolidating
211. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
 212. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) (looking to the named representatives’ 
citizenships for determining the citizenship of a non-CAFA class for diversity jurisdiction
purposes); Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365–67 (1921) (same). 
213. See Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, supra note 186, at 37–38 (discussing
state-based limitations and prospective solutions).
214. The bias rationale may still play a role in certain cases, of course. Some commentators
have noted:
The types of corporations that find themselves as mass-tort defendants—Big Tobacco,
Big Pharma, Big Anything—are often major political and social players in their home 
states. Even if they did not choose their headquarters to minimize litigation risk, they 
may have powerful lobbies in the state legislature and, over time, may seek protective
substantive or procedural legislation and work to help shape the (often elected) state
judiciary. Similarly, local jurors may not be eager to put a major local employer and
economic engine out of business.
Andrew D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, Aggregation on Defendants’ Terms: Bristol-Myers Squibb
and the Federalization of Mass-Tort Litigation, 59 B.C. L. REV. 1251, 1294 (2018). And, 
intriguingly, some of the Court’s personal jurisdiction decisions have a ring of diversity
jurisdiction about them:  
Bristol-Myers sounded more like it was arguing in favor of federal diversity jurisdiction
than for limitations on personal jurisdiction. The assumption underlying Bristol-
Myers’s position is that California judges cannot be presumed to treat an out-of-state
defendant like Bristol-Myers fairly. . . . Such an argument hews more closely to the
traditional justification for including diversity jurisdiction in Article III, namely, that 
state courts cannot be trusted to treat out-of-staters evenhandedly. 
Id. at 1302. 
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018).
 216. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 214, at 1262–63 (articulating the genesis of MDL and the 
aims of its statutory architects).
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pretrial cases.217 Although personal jurisdiction limits in MDL cases 
remain uncertain,218 there is no question that MDL in federal court 
offers multistate aggregation on a scale that would be impossible in
state court.219 Diversity jurisdiction makes that aggregation possible by 
enabling state law cases to be filed in federal court and then 
consolidated across state lines in a single MDL court. To be sure, MDL 
aggregation has its problems,220 but the aggregation power of federal 
MDL is undeniable. Further, it seems obvious that diversity-based 
MDLs have little to do with the bias rationale because no matter where 
individual cases are filed, the cases are all transferred to a single federal
court in a state that may be the home state of the party who invoked
federal jurisdiction in the first place.221 
These diversity-based aggregation benefits are appreciable, but 
diversity jurisdiction has even greater potential. Current personal 
jurisdiction law stymies broader aggregation in federal court because 
Rule 4(k) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure generally
incorporates the restrictive limits that personal jurisdiction imposes on 
state courts in multistate cases.222 Of course, Congress or the Supreme
Court could lift personal jurisdiction’s obstacles to aggregation in 
federal court by expanding the scope of Rule 4(k) in certain multiparty 
217. Id. at 1266–67; see also Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 
75 LA. L. REV. 399, 414 (2014) (“Centralization likewise advantages defendants by making
meaningful closure possible through a global settlement.”).
 218. See Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, supra note 186, at 43 (discussing 
some of the potential restrictions on personal jurisdiction in MDL cases); see also Scott Dodson,
Plaintiff Personal Jurisdiction and Venue Transfer, 117 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1469–71 (2019)
[hereinafter Dodson, Plaintiff Personal Jurisdiction] (discussing the limits of personal jurisdiction
over plaintiffs in MDL cases).
219. For a discussion of the possibility of informal multistate coordination, see Francis E.
McGovern, Toward a Cooperative Strategy for Federal and State Judges in Mass Tort Litigation, 
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1867, 1886–92 (2000). 
220. For example, centralization increases the power of a single judge and, sometimes, repeat
attorneys. See Bradt & Rave, supra note 214, at 1314–15 (discussing the risks of increasingly 
personal relationships among repeat actors in MDL cases); Elizabeth Chamblee Burch,
Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 70–72 (2017) (same).
221. Notwithstanding the forum-defendant bar to removal, nothing prevents a defendant
from removing a case based on diversity jurisdiction in one state and then moving to transfer the
case to the federal court in its home state. Nor does the law prevent a plaintiff from filing in
federal court based on diversity jurisdiction in the plaintiff’s home state or by filing elsewhere and
then seeking transfer to the plaintiff’s home state. See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 
523 (1990) (sanctioning both options). 
222. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(1)(A) (“Serving a summons or filing a waiver of service 
establishes personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is subject to the jurisdiction of a court of
general jurisdiction in the state where the district court is located.”).
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cases.223 But the efficacy of this personal jurisdiction fix depends upon
the expansion of diversity jurisdiction over such cases, for the fix is only
available in federal court. Diversity jurisdiction thus holds enormous 
additional potential as a catalyst for facilitating aggregation in federal 
court on a much grander scale. 
B. Other Benefits of Diversity Jurisdiction 
Freeing the debate from the tethers of the bias rationale also sets 
other considerations in a new light. For example, diversity jurisdiction 
can help avoid other state court biases that are not inherently tied to 
out-of-state citizenship. 
As shown above, even some of the Constitution’s Framers seemed 
more focused on anticreditor or economic biases than nonresident 
status generally.224 Corporations have long valued diversity jurisdiction 
because of a belief that federal courts are more business friendly than
state courts.225 That sentiment largely continues in modern times: a 
study published in 1992 found 45 percent of surveyed defense attorneys 
reported that they perceived state court bias against corporate 
defendants,226 and a study published in 1995 found that corporations
tend to favor selecting federal court.227 
Relatedly, some litigants perceive certain state courts as more 
plaintiff friendly, or class action friendly, than their corresponding 
223. See, e.g., Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, supra note 186, at 39–40
(suggesting rule expansion for pendent personal jurisdiction).  
224. See supra notes 50–56 and accompanying text; see also Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine 
M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1353, 1398–1404 (2006) (arguing that
federal judges have seen themselves as better guarantors of a national free market).
 225. See PURCELL, BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION, supra note 120, at 64
(“Diversity jurisdiction symbolized for both Progressives and their adversaries the de facto
alliance between corporations and the national judiciary.”); Charles E. Clark, Diversity of
Citizenship Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 19 A.B.A. J. 499, 502 (1933) (reviewing data in
support of this point); Frank, Historical Bases, supra note 12, at 28 (noting the anticipatory nature
of this concern); William H. Taft, Criticisms of the Federal Judiciary, 29 AM. L. REV. 641, 650–51
(1895) (calling state courts part of “a corporation-hating community”). But see WILLIAM G. ROSS,
A MUTED FURY: POPULISTS, PROGRESSIVES, AND LABOR UNIONS CONFRONT THE COURTS,
1890–1937, at 6 (1994) (disputing federal courts’ procorporate tendency by arguing that the 
“federal judicial power and the judiciary’s solicitude for the rights of private property continued 
to grow throughout the antebellum period”).
 226. Miller, supra note 141, at 409.
 227. See Flango, Litigant Choice, supra note 155, at 968 (“Attorneys who do regard corporate 
status as an important consideration in forum selection tend to favor federal court if their client
is a corporation and state court if their opponent is a corporation.”). 
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federal courts.228 CAFA, which is discussed in more detail below, was 
motivated in large part by these concerns.229 Although state procedural 
rules largely mimic federal procedural rules, state rules have some 
differences,230 differences that often are perceived as advantaging 
plaintiffs.231 
Others see antirural or antiurban biases in state courts.232 And
some have suggested that diversity jurisdiction can help overcome
racial bias in state courts.233 Political or social preferences may differ in 
state and federal court,234 such as when a litigation raises sensitive or 
highly charged issues like abortion or religion. Quite aside from biases,
diversity jurisdiction offers certain efficiencies, including interstate 
procedural uniformity and familiarity and the ability to transfer to
more convenient locations.235 
228. See  THOMAS E. WILLGING & SHANNON R. WHEATMAN, FED. JUD. CTR., ATTORNEY
REPORTS ON THE IMPACT OF AMCHEM AND ORTIZ ON CHOICE OF A FEDERAL OR STATE
FORUM IN CLASS ACTION LITIGATION 8 (2004) (reporting class action plaintiffs’ preference for
state court); Eric Helland & Alexander Tabarrok, The Effect of Electoral Institutions on Tort
Awards, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 341, 368 (2002) (exploring incentives for state judges to favor in-
state plaintiffs); Purcell, The Class Action Fairness Act, supra note 82, at 1849 (“For more than
half a century, from Reconstruction to the New Deal, tort plaintiffs suing national corporations
preferred state courts, in part because they believed that federal judges were biased against
them.”); cf. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal
Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 128, 131 (2000) (finding evidence of antiplaintiff bias in federal
appellate courts).
 229. See Kermit Roosevelt III, Choice of Law in Federal Courts: From Erie and Klaxon to 
CAFA and Shady Grove, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 49 (2012) (“Congress [in passing CAFA] was
plainly concerned that state courts were certifying too many class actions, and it plainly was
hoping that fewer would be certified in federal court.”).
 230. See Zachary D. Clopton, Procedural Retrenchment and the States, 106 CALIF. L. REV. 
411, 423–45 (2018) (highlighting certain significant procedural differences).
 231. See Miller, supra note 141, at 418–22 (reporting attorney perceptions of proplaintiff 
procedures in state courts); cf. Stephen B. Burbank & Sean Farhang, Litigation Reform: An
Institutional Approach, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1543, 1551–80 (2014) (making the case that federal
court procedures have become increasingly antiplaintiff and antilitigation).
 232. See generally Debra Lyn Bassett, Ruralism, 88 IOWA L. REV. 273 (2003) (recognizing an 
increasingly urban focus in institutions and policies at the expense of rural interests).
 233. See Benjamin V. Madison, III, Color-Blind: Procedure’s Quiet but Crucial Role in
Achieving Racial Justice, 78 UMKC L. REV. 617, 618–19 (2010) (highlighting procedural elements
of the criminal trial of officers involved in the Rodney King beating).
 234. See generally Letter from GBA Strategies to Nat’l Ctr. for State Cts. (Dec. 4, 2014), 
http://jpo.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/11204/3967/Analysis%20of%C20National%C20Survey%C 
20of%C20Registered%20Voters.pdf?sequence=4 [https://perma.cc/C4UC-GAV2] (finding
evidence of public perceptions of political bias in state courts).
 235. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (2018) (allowing venue transfer for the convenience of the 
parties and witnesses); Frank, Case for Diversity Jurisdiction, supra note 126, at 408–09 (lauding
the uniformity and familiarity of federal procedures). 
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This Article does not defend these potential benefits of diversity 
jurisdiction here or suggest that they should carry the day.236 Instead,
the point is that minimizing the out-of-state bias rationale allows these 
factors to be confronted and debated more clearly on their own terms 
rather than be overshadowed by the lens of out-of-state bias.
C. An Illustration: CAFA 
Unmooring the diversity debate from the bias rationale, while 
permitting important modern considerations like aggregation or
mitigation of other biases to take center stage, allows judges,
legislators, rulemakers, and commentators to have a more honest and 
useful conversation about diversity jurisdiction and its role. CAFA237 
offers an illustration of how improved rationale transparency could
benefit reform efforts. The use of CAFA as an illustration is not to 
defend the statute. Rather, this Section hopes to show how the 
centrality of the bias rationale distracted the CAFA debate from the
real policy choices at hand.  
Before CAFA, only named representatives’ citizenships were 
counted for complete diversity purposes,238 a doctrine that enabled 
class counsel to manipulate the complete diversity rule by selecting 
representatives who destroyed complete diversity and thus defeated
diversity jurisdiction.239 In addition, class actions were subject to the
forum-defendant bar to removal: even if the class representatives were
completely diverse, the case could not be removed to federal court if
any defendant were a citizen of the state where the case was filed.240 
Also, removal required the consent of all defendants and removal
236. Using diversity jurisdiction to alleviate state biases other than out-of-state bias implicates
some of the same challenges, and may have similar unintended consequences, as using diversity
jurisdiction to alleviate out-of-state bias. See supra Part III (discussing the limitations to out-of-
state bias justifications). Further, encouragement of separate systems with different preferences
may make each system more extreme. See Diego A. Zambrano, Federal Aggrandizement and the
Decay of State Courts, 86 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019), (manuscript at 53–54) (on file with
the Duke Law Journal) (illustrating normative concerns with adversely positioned state and
federal court regimes). 
237. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (codified in scattered
sections of 28 U.S.C.).
238. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365–67 (1921) (citing precedent
diversity jurisdiction principles elaborated in Stewart v. Dunham, 115 U.S. 61, 64 (1885)).
 239. See Howard M. Erichson, CAFA’s Impact on Class Action Lawyers, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 
1593, 1597–98 (2008) (“Before CAFA, if plaintiffs’ counsel preferred state court, it was easy to
avoid federal court simply by choosing class representatives to destroy complete diversity, by
naming a nondiverse or in-state defendant . . . .” (footnotes omitted)). 
240. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2018).
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within one year of filing.241 Finally, unincorporated entities are deemed 
citizens of each state where its members were citizens,242 meaning that 
some entities were citizens of many states and increasing the likelihood 
that those entities would destroy complete diversity. These features 
enabled class representatives and class counsel to select favorable state
courts for litigation and engineer strategies to avoid federal court even
though the class members might reside in many different states.243 
In a nutshell, CAFA broadens diversity jurisdiction over certain
multistate class actions with at least one hundred class members.244 For 
CAFA classes, the statute authorizes diversity jurisdiction based on 
minimal diversity of any class member and any defendant.245 The
statute also lifts the forum-defendant and one-year bars and eliminates 
the unanimity requirement.246 Finally, the statute makes 
unincorporated entities citizens only of “the State where it has its 
principal place of business and the State under whose laws it is
organized.”247 
CAFA expands opportunities for defendants to secure a federal 
forum on CAFA classes. Congress’s rationale seems to have been not
to alleviate any bias against out-of-state defendants but to harness the 
advantages of federal court for defendants.248 Congress and CAFA
supporters saw federal courts as more favorable to defendants and to 
businesses. At the same time, federal courts were perceived as more
241. Id. § 1446(b)(2)(A), (c)(1). 
242. See, e.g., Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1016 (2016)
(illustrating this rule in the context of real estate investment trusts).
 243. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 15–25 (2005) (listing different purported abuses of
jurisdictional flexibility proffered to class actions). The general removal statute also bars appellate
review of remand orders, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d), while CAFA restores appellate review, id.
§ 1453(c). 
244. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(5)(B).
 245. Id. § 1332(d)(2)(A) (extending diversity jurisdiction when “any member of a class of 
plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant”). The constitutionality of using 
putative class members’ citizenships to establish diversity jurisdiction has been questioned. See,
e.g., Mark Moller, A New Look at the Original Meaning of the Diversity Clause, 51 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 1113, 1130 (2009) (considering the relation of diversity jurisdiction to cases’ underlying
controversies). 
246. See 28 U.S.C. § 1453(b) (authorizing removal of CAFA classes without regard to any 
defendant’s forum citizenship).
 247. Id. § 1332(d)(10).
 248. E.g., Burbank, supra note 72, at 1528 (“[T]he reason for federal subject matter 
jurisdiction . . . might seem to be a desire to give the corporate defendant . . . a more favorable
forum.”); Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, The Impact of the Class Action Fairness Act
on the Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Filings and Removals, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1723, 
1725 (2008) (reviewing the corporate political interests supporting CAFA).
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hostile to class actions and were motivated to use diversity jurisdiction 
to combat perceived proclass, antidefendant, and antibusiness biases in 
certain state courts while neutralizing the plaintiff-side forum selection
of those state courts.249 That motivation is an appropriate justification 
for diversity jurisdiction and is one that should be debated on its own
terms.250 
However, because Congress relied primarily on Article III’s grant 
of diversity jurisdiction to support CAFA, the centrality of the bias
rationale to diversity jurisdiction induced Congress and CAFA
supporters to justify the act on the basis of combating out-of-state
bias.251 The Act itself expressly finds that 
abuses in class actions undermine . . . the concept of diversity 
jurisdiction as intended by the framers of the United States
Constitution, in that State and local courts are . . . sometimes acting
in ways that demonstrate bias against out-of-State defendants. . . .252 
The accompanying Senate Report states that “[o]ne of the primary 
historical reasons for diversity jurisdiction is the reassurance of fairness
249. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 14 (2005) (calling out “some state court judges [who] are less
careful than their federal court counterparts about applying the procedural requirements that 
govern class actions”); Marcus, supra note 84, at 1252 (discussing CAFA support among 
antiregulatory lawyers and litigants). 
250. To be fair, the congressional hearings did confront some of the CAFA policies on their
own terms. See S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 51–75 (2005) (chronicling criticisms of CAFA and respective
rebuttals). For examples of efforts to engage those justifications post-enactment, see WILLGING
& WHEATMAN, supra note 228, at 34–36 (noting that “cases were almost equally likely to be
certified” in state and federal courts and reporting slightly lower certification rate in state courts),
and see generally Patricia Hatamyar Moore, Confronting the Myth of “State Court Class Action
Abuses” Through an Understanding of Heuristics and a Plea for More Statistics, 82 UMKC L. REV. 
133 (2013).
 251. See Marcus, supra note 84, at 1293 (“Whether real or imagined, local bias fairly 
frequently spurred arguments in CAFA debates.”); see also Class Action Fairness Act of 2003:
Hearing on H.R. 1115 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. 23 (2003) (statement of 
John H. Beisner, Partner, O’Melveny & Myers LLP), http://commdocs.house.gov/ 
committees/judiciary/hju87093.000/hju87093_0f.htm [https://perma.cc/N5DF-R2XN] (“[T]here
can no longer be any question that some local judges are exhibiting bias against out-of-state 
defendants . . . the very type of bias that led to the creation of diversity jurisdiction in the first
place.”).
252. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4)(B), 119 Stat. 4, 5. The Act
also finds that state courts were “keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court” and 
were “making judgments that impose their view of the law on other States and bind the rights of
the residents of those States.” Id. § 2(a)(4)(A), (C). Those findings have never been established
as historical goals of diversity jurisdiction.
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and competence that a federal court can supply to an out-of-state
defendant facing suit in state court.”253 It continues: 
As set forth in Article III of the Constitution, the Framers established
diversity jurisdiction to ensure fairness for all parties in litigation
involving persons from multiple jurisdictions, particularly cases in 
which defendants from one state are sued in the local courts of
another state. Interstate class actions which often involve millions of
parties from numerous states—present the precise concerns that 
diversity jurisdiction was designed to prevent: frequently in such
cases, there appears to be state court provincialism against out-of-
state defendants or a judicial failure to recognize the interests of other 
states in the litigation.254 
These are tenuous justifications for CAFA.255 Out-of-state bias 
tends to justify retaining—not eliminating, as CAFA does—the
complete diversity rule and the forum-defendant rule because a 
defendant corporation sued in its home state should face no bias by a
state court. Eliminating these features might be consistent with a more 
honest appraisal of CAFA’s motivations, but, without more
explanation and evidence, they are inconsistent with the bias 
rationale.256 In addition, opponents have challenged the underlying 
premise that state courts were, in fact, exhibiting such bias.257 
This focus on the bias rationale has diverted attention away from 
the real debate about CAFA. Indeed, courts have picked up on 
CAFA’s reliance on the bias rationale and repeated it in their opinions 
and as grounding for their holdings. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have 
253. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 5 (2005); cf. id. at 7–8 (“According to the Framers, the primary
purpose of diversity jurisdiction was to protect citizens in one state from the injustice that might 
result if they were forced to litigate in out-of-state courts.” (citing Pease v. Peck, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
595, 599 (1855))). 
254. Id. at 6 (footnote omitted). The Senate Report also notes “that the Framers were
concerned that state courts might discriminate against interstate businesses and commercial
activities, and thus viewed diversity jurisdiction as a means of ensuring the protection of interstate
commerce.” Id. at 8. 
255. Cross, supra note 21, at 194 (“CAFA has raised concerns among lawyers and scholars in
part because it unambiguously extends diversity jurisdiction beyond what many believe is the sole
purpose of diversity jurisdiction: the prevention of state court bias against out-of-state parties.”).
 256. See Burbank, supra note 72, at 1517–18 (articulating some of the reasons behind CAFA
support). It is possible that the bias rationale could support minimal diversity and the removal of
the forum-defendant rule, but only if evidence suggested that the presence of one out-of-state
party on the side of the party invoking diversity jurisdiction was likely to generate state court 
prejudice against out-of-state citizens despite the citizenships of the other parties.
 257. See, e.g., Purcell, The Class Action Fairness Act, supra note 82, at 1885 (“[T]here was no 
evidence that bias or unfairness existed in state courts generally . . . .”).
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both stated that, “In enacting CAFA, Congress sought to correct state
and local court abuses in class actions such as bias against out-of-state 
defendants by expanding federal diversity jurisdiction over interstate 
class actions.”258 The Eleventh Circuit recently held that the dual in-
state and out-of-state citizenship of defendants could not create 
minimal diversity jurisdiction sufficient to allow removal of a CAFA
case to federal court because those defendants “face no risk of any 
conceivable local bias” in the state court.259 Litigants, too, have tied
CAFA to the bias rationale, with one brief asserting: “CAFA was 
adopted for the purpose of protecting the precise category of 
defendants at issue in this case: out-of-state defendants against whom 
large damage claims have been asserted and who fear that they may be
discriminated against in state court.”260 
These courts have been waylaid by the bias rationale. CAFA 
instead should be viewed in light of its real purposes: protecting
interstate commerce from perceived proclass, antidefendant, and
antibusiness leanings in certain state courts. Those purposes animate 
reasonable debates about the policy wisdom of CAFA and the legal 
questions of its interpretation. But those debates should not depend 
upon the bias rationale.
V. REFORMING DIVERSITY JURISDICTION
This Part will show how reorienting diversity jurisdiction from the
bias rationale and toward other considerations like aggregation leads 
to several possible areas for reform. It also assesses the 
constitutionality of using considerations other than the bias rationale 
to support such reform efforts.
A. Potential Reforms 
Refocusing the diversity debate suggests reconsideration of the 
forum-defendant bar to removal, the complete diversity rule, and the
tests for citizenship. This Part does not argue that these reforms should 
be pursued; they present complicated policy issues involving 
federalism, federal docket control, and party convenience and fairness.
258. Speed v. JMA Energy Co., 872 F.3d 1122, 1126 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting Arbuckle
Mountain Ranch of Tex., Inc. v. Chesapeake Energy Corp., 810 F.3d 335, 337 (5th Cir. 2016)).
259. Life of the S. Ins. v. Carzell, 851 F.3d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 2017); cf. Hunter v. Medstar
Geo. Univ. Hosp., 144 F. Supp. 3d 28, 29–30 (D.D.C. 2015) (relying, in part, on the lack of out-of-
state bias to deny CAFA jurisdiction).
 260. IADC Amicus Brief Program, 81 DEF. COUNS. J. 404, 430 (2014).
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Rather, reengaging those complicated policy issues, unshackled by the
bias rationale, may lead to more sincere discussions where individuals 
can meaningfully consider reform in these areas of the law.
1. The Forum-Defendant Bar. The most obvious reform possibility 
is the elimination of the forum-defendant bar to removal of diversity 
cases. The general removal statute bars a case founded entirely on 
diversity jurisdiction from being removed if any served defendant is a 
citizen of the forum state.261 This bar is based completely on the bias 
rationale: the presence of an in-state defendant should obviate the 
need for the defendants to invoke a federal forum’s protection from 
local bias.262 
Yet the forum-defendant bar presents other issues for 
consideration. On the one hand, the forum-defendant bar helps control 
federal dockets, preserve state prerogatives, and reduce defendant
forum shopping.263 On the other hand, the forum-defendant bar gives 
plaintiffs a distinct advantage against defendants because the bar 
prevents defendants from invoking a federal forum that plaintiffs could 
have invoked in the first instance. This forum-choice disparity gives rise 
to both plaintiff-side and defense-side gamesmanship. Plaintiffs try to 
ensure joinder of an in-state defendant to prevent removal even if their
stronger claims are against out-of-state defendants, while out-of-state
defendants might try to remove a case quickly, before any in-state 
defendant has been served.264 The bar also prevents salutary removal 
on grounds unrelated to out-of-state bias, such as state bias against the 
particular type of defendant or defense likely to be asserted. Finally, 
the bar also prevents removal when access to federal court might allow 
for advantageous federal consolidation in an MDL or other aggregated
litigation. 
261. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)(2) (2018).
 262. See Gentile v. Biogen Idec, Inc., 934 F. Supp. 2d 313, 319 (D. Mass. 2013) (“[T]he 
protection-from-bias rationale behind the removal power evaporates when the defendant seeking
removal is a citizen of the forum state.”). 
263. Congress has chosen to limit diversity-based removal for substantive reasons in other
areas. See 28 U.S.C. § 1445(c) (prohibiting removal of cases that arise out of the forum state’s
worker’s compensation laws). 
264. See, e.g., Arthur Hellman, Lonny Hoffman, Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Joan Steinman &
Georgene Vairo, Neutralizing the Stratagem of “Snap Removal”: A Proposed Amendment to the
Judicial Code, 9 FED. CTS. L. REV. 103, 104–08 (2016) (describing these strategies and proposing 
legislation to address the gamesmanship of plaintiffs and defendants regarding the forum-
defendant bar).
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Minimizing the role of the bias rationale allows for fuller 
consideration of these issues. Perhaps the bar is sound as is. Perhaps 
additional exceptions to the bar are warranted for aggregation
purposes. Perhaps the bar should be eliminated entirely. Or perhaps 
judges should have discretion to suspend the bar under certain 
circumstances. Whatever the ultimate fate of the forum-defendant bar, 
it should depend upon far more than just the bias rationale.
2. The Complete Diversity Rule. Another possible reform could 
involve the complete diversity rule, which, ever since Strawbridge, has 
been justified on state-bias grounds.265 The shadow of the bias rationale 
has loomed over recent incursions on the complete diversity rule. The 
supplemental jurisdiction statute, for example, took pains to preserve 
the complete diversity rule,266 and the Court has continued to interpret 
the supplemental jurisdiction statute in light of the bias rationale.267 
CAFA supporters unconvincingly pitched CAFA’s adoption of 
minimal diversity as consistent with the bias rationale.268 And other 
statutes grounded in minimal diversity have been exceedingly modest 
despite the appeal of broader federal jurisdiction.269 The MMTJA,270 
for example, grants minimal diversity jurisdiction over a very narrow 
class of cases, like airplane crashes,271 that present a “single accident, 
where at least 75 natural persons have died in the accident at a discrete 
location.”272 MMTJA proponents initially urged broader jurisdictional
265. See supra note 90. 
266. See 13D WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3567 (“Congress’s effort thus grants
supplemental jurisdiction broadly and then endeavors to withdraw the grant in certain instances,
in an effort to preserve the complete diversity rule for diversity of citizenship cases.”).
 267. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 553–54 (2005) (stating
that the bias rationale “explains” why supplemental jurisdiction preserves the complete diversity
rule of the diversity statute). 
268. See supra text accompanying notes 251–55.
 269. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 6614(c) (2018) (granting minimal diversity jurisdiction for certain 
Y2K class actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (granting minimal diversity jurisdiction for interpleader
actions). 
270. Multiparty, Multiforum Jurisdiction Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat.
1758, 1826. 
271. H.R. REP. NO. 106-276, at 21 (1999).
272. 28 U.S.C. § 1369(a).
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grants to facilitate aggregation of complex litigation,273 but the
MMTJA as enacted was far narrower.274 
Like the forum-defendant rule, however, the complete diversity
rule has its own rich web of policy implications, and when debated out 
of the bias rationale’s shadow, those policy implications might lead to 
additional incursions of complete diversity. The rule obstructs 
aggregation by preventing federal court joinder of nondiverse parties 
who may be important—even necessary—to the litigation.275 The rule 
thus causes unfairness, inefficiency, and duplicative litigation.276 As a
secondary matter, the complete diversity rule, by demanding attention
to every party’s citizenship, greatly complicates supplemental 
jurisdiction, incentivizes party gamesmanship, and exacerbates 
nettlesome questions of citizenship. Of course, any erosion of the 
complete diversity rule should consider the effect on federal dockets,277 
the infringement on state prerogatives and on the development of state 
law precedent,278 and the possibility that diversity expansion could 
benefit one class of litigants more than another.279 But it may be, on
273. See  AM. L. INST., COMPLEX LITIGATION: STATUTORY RECOMMENDATIONS AND
ANALYSIS 37 (1994) (recommending minimal diversity for federal cases involving one or more
common questions of fact where consolidation would promote justice, efficiency, and fairness); 
Rowe & Sibley, supra note 134, at 55 (proposing minimal diversity to join certain claims arising 
from “the same transaction, occurrence, or series of related transactions or occurrences”).
 274. See C. Douglas Floyd, The Limits of Minimal Diversity, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 613, 616–28 
(2003) [hereinafter Floyd, The Limits] (detailing the MMTJA’s legislative history).
 275. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19(b) (acknowledging the problem of necessary parties who cannot 
be joined). Personal jurisdiction hinders multistate party joinder as well, but expanding personal
jurisdiction to facilitate joinder in federal court is a simple matter of rule or statutory amendment.
See Dodson, Personal Jurisdiction and Aggregation, supra note 186. 
276. Other scholars have strongly supported efforts to eliminate duplicative litigation. See 
generally, e.g., Redish, supra note 187.
277. By one estimate, more than 550,000 cases filed in state court in 2013 qualified for minimal
diversity but not complete diversity. SHEPHERD, supra note 106, at 23–24. It is unclear how many 
of those might end up in federal court under a minimal diversity grant, but whatever cases do
would bring to federal courts many of the complexities inherent in diversity jurisdiction, including
difficult Erie issues, abstention considerations, and certification pressures. 
278. Expansive federal diversity jurisdiction may also exacerbate the gravitational pull of 
federal court decision-making on state court precedent. See Dodson, Gravitational Force, supra
note 86, at 738.
 279. See  PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY, supra note 97, at 45 (arguing that
corporations have used diversity jurisdiction to subject parties of more modest means to a more
expensive litigation forum for purposes of pressuring more favorable settlements); Dodson,
Jurisdiction in the Trump Era, supra note 198, at 81 (cautioning that recent expansions of diversity
jurisdiction have disproportionately advantaged defendants). Some data even suggest that 
vertical forum shopping, and therefore the possibility of removal, affects case outcomes. See
Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal Anything About
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balance, that the statutory experiments with minimal diversity to date 
are too modest in light of the benefits of federal aggregation and 
streamlined jurisdictional determinations. Marginalization of the bias 
rationale would allow debates about the use of minimal diversity in 
these areas to focus on their own merits and demerits. 
3. Citizenship Tests. A third area of reform is the test for 
determining citizenship. Historically, citizenship determinations have 
been complex and unpredictable. The test for an individual U.S.
citizen’s state citizenship for purposes of diversity jurisdiction depends 
upon the individual’s subjective intent to permanently reside in a 
particular state,280 which can lead to self-serving testimony and 
disruptive preliminary hearings involving significant evidentiary
proof.281 Citizenship of artificial entities suffers from similar 
complexities and uncertainties.282 Most artificial entities— 
partnerships, real estate trusts, unions, associations, and the like—take 
on the citizenships of each member.283 Such derivative citizenship
causes its own headaches.284 
Admittedly, citizenship tests have not always hewn closely to the 
bias rationale.285 But a more express disavowal of the bias rationale 
might encourage alternative formulations that expand or restrict 
the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 581, 598–606 (1998)
(describing and explaining this phenomenon).  
280. 13E WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 12, § 3612. 
281. Id.
 282. See Americold Realty Tr. v. ConAgra Foods, Inc., 136 S. Ct. 1012, 1014 (2016) (stating 
that citizenship “can become metaphysical when applied to legal entities”); Stewart, supra note
86, at 214 (“With the advent of a perplexing variety of corporate structural forms, determining
domicile for an entity, as opposed to a natural person, has become a byzantine task.”).
 283. See Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1014 (2016) (“While humans and corporations can assert
their own citizenship, other entities take the citizenship of the members.”); Carden v. Arkoma 
Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 195–96 (1990) (stating the “oft-repeated rule that diversity jurisdiction in a
suit by or against the entity depends on the citizenship of ‘all the members’” (quoting Chapman
v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677, 682 (1889))); see, e.g., Americold, 136 S. Ct. at 1014 (real estate trusts);
Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 146–47 (1965) (unions); Great S. Fire Proof
Hotel Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449, 456–57 (1900) (joint-stock companies); Chapman v. Barney, 129
U.S. 677, 682 (1889) (partnerships). For a thorough discussion, see 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra
note 12, § 3630.1. 
284. For example, one judge analyzed at least nine layers of embedded citizenships before
determining the party was nondiverse. Quantlab Fin., LLC v. Tower Research Capital, LLC, 715
F. Supp. 2d 542, 546–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
285. See James E. Pfander, The Tidewater Problem: Article III and Constitutional Change, 79
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1925, 1952 (2004) (“By making party identity the test of jurisdiction . . . 
diversity offers a cleaner jurisdictional test” than an alternative approach to addressing state court
bias, which requires an “official inquiry into problems with the quality of justice in state court.”).
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federal jurisdiction for other justifiable reasons or lead to the
development of tests that focus on the virtues of clarity and 
predictability.286 
A recent exposition of the test for corporate citizenship, for
example, may be worth emulating. Corporations are statutorily
prescribed the citizenship of their state of incorporation and the state 
of their “principal place of business.”287 The latter proved “difficult to
apply,”288 and lower courts developed a number of tests, including the
“nerve center,” “business activities,” and “center of gravity” tests for 
determining a corporation’s principal place of business.289 As the
Supreme Court noted in 2010 in Hertz Corp. v. Friend:290 
This complexity may reflect an unmediated judicial effort to apply the 
statutory phrase “principal place of business” in light of the general
purpose of diversity jurisdiction, i.e., an effort to find the State where 
a corporation is least likely to suffer out-of-state prejudice when it is
sued in a local court. But, if so, that task seems doomed to failure. 
After all, the relevant purposive concern—prejudice against an out-
of-state party—will often depend upon factors that courts cannot 
easily measure, for example, a corporation’s image, its history, and its
advertising, while the factors that courts can more easily measure, for 
example, its office or plant location, its sales, its employment, or the 
nature of the goods or services it supplies, will sometimes bear no
more than a distant relation to the likelihood of prejudice. At the 
same time, this approach is at war with administrative simplicity. And 
it has failed to achieve a nationally uniform interpretation of federal 
law, an unfortunate consequence in a federal legal system.291 
Hertz cleaned up that mess by holding that a corporation’s 
principal place of business is “the place where the corporation’s high
level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s 
activities,” typically its headquarters.292 In giving the statute this 
construction, the Court “place[d] primary weight upon the need for 
judicial administration of a jurisdictional statute to remain as simple as 
286. See Scott Dodson, The Complexity of Jurisdictional Clarity, 97 VA. L. REV. 1, 9–11 (2011)
(recounting the Court’s preoccupation with jurisdictional clarity).
287. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c) (2018).
288. Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 89 (2010).
 289. Id. at 90–91.
 290. Id. at 89. 
291. Id. at 92 (citation omitted).
 292. Id. at 80–81. 
DODSON IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 10/16/2019 3:12 PM       
   
 
  
   
 
  
  
   
  
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
   
 
  
 
  
 
 
 
  
    
   
   
     
  
  
320 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:267
possible.”293 The Court acknowledged that its focus on administrability 
could be seen as at odds with the bias rationale:
We also recognize that the use of a “nerve center” test may in some
cases produce results that seem to cut against the basic rationale for 
28 U.S.C. § 1332. For example, if the bulk of a company’s business
activities visible to the public take place in New Jersey, while its top
officers direct those activities just across the river in New York, the
“principal place of business” is New York. One could argue that
members of the public in New Jersey would be less likely to be  
prejudiced against the corporation than persons in New York—yet
the corporation will still be entitled to remove a New Jersey state case
to federal court. And note too that the same corporation would be
unable to remove a New York state case to federal court, despite the 
New York public’s presumed prejudice against the corporation.294 
Nevertheless, the Court opted for a rule that elevated clarity over 
effectuation of the bias rationale.295 
Hertz’s minimization of the role of the bias rationale as an
interpretive heuristic should be applauded and, in conjunction with
other factors implicated by diversity jurisdiction, emulated in other
areas.296 Perhaps the test for unincorporated entities could similarly be
simplified; their citizenship could be determined solely by the state
whose law creates the entity, or perhaps both that state and the state 
of the entity’s principal place of business, like the test for 
corporations.297 Or perhaps the test for a natural person’s citizenship
could be based on objective factors rather than subjective intent. These 
possibilities may or may not prove sensible, but their sensibility ought
293. Id. at 80. The Court stated: 
[A]dministrative simplicity is a major virtue in a jurisdictional statute. Complex
jurisdictional tests complicate a case, eating up time and money as the parties litigate,
not the merits of their claims, but which court is the right court to decide those claims.
Complex tests produce appeals and reversals, encourage gamesmanship, and, again,
diminish the likelihood that results and settlements will reflect a claim’s legal and
factual merits. Judicial resources too are at stake. . . . Simple jurisdictional rules also
promote greater predictability.
Id. at 94 (citations omitted).
 294. Id. at 96 (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
 295. Id. (“We understand that such seeming anomalies will arise. However, in view of the 
necessity of having a clearer rule, we must accept them.”). 
296. The rule of considering only class representatives’ citizenships for purposes of diversity
jurisdiction in a class action, see supra note 212, is a similar paean to administrative simplicity.
 297. See generally Christine M. Kailus, Note, Diversity Jurisdiction and Unincorporated
Businesses: Collapsing the Doctrinal Wall, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 1543 (2007) (proposing such a 
test). Notably, CAFA adopts this rule for unincorporated entities who are parties in a CAFA
class action. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(10) (2018).
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2019] BEYOND BIAS IN DIVERSITY JURISDICTION 321
to depend primarily on factors other than the impact of out-of-state 
bias. 
B. Constitutional Constraints 
The Constitution erects no significant obstacle to severing the bias 
rationale from debates about diversity jurisdiction. The bias rationale 
is a policy consideration, not a constitutional constraint. As long as 
jurisdictional doctrine satisfies Article III, incompatibility with the bias 
rationale is of no constitutional moment.
The Diversity Clause extends the judicial power to “controversies 
. . . between Citizens of different States.”298 That is all that is required.
The Constitution does not codify the bias rationale in any form.
Consistent with this language, the Court’s opinions construing the 
Diversity Clause focus entirely on its text, which the Court has
consistently read to authorize diversity jurisdiction based on “minimal
diversity”—any one plaintiff of a different citizenship from any one 
defendant—without any regard to possibilities of state bias.299 Thus,
statutory grants of federal diversity jurisdiction have long authorized
even in-state plaintiffs to invoke diversity jurisdiction, despite the lack 
of any presumed state bias against them,300 and the Court has never
held any congressional authorization of diversity jurisdiction to be 
298. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
 299. For example, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545 U.S. 546 (2005), the
Court stated:
The Constitution broadly provides for federal-court jurisdiction in controversies
“between Citizens of different States.” Art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This Court has read that 
provision to demand no more than “minimal diversity,” i.e., so long as one party on the 
plaintiffs’ side and one party on the defendants’ side are of diverse citizenship,
Congress may authorize federal courts to exercise diversity jurisdiction. 
Id. at 584. See also, e.g., Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 577 n.6 (2004)
(“We understand ‘minimal diversity’ to mean the existence of at least one party who is diverse in
citizenship from one party on the other side of the case, even though the extraconstitutional
‘complete diversity’ required by our cases is lacking.”); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386
U.S. 523, 531 (1967) (“Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal
jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not co-citizens.”); cf.
Pfander, supra note 200, at 1470 (“For the past generation or two, lawyers, academics and
Supreme Court justices have understood that the decision in State Farm v. Tashire provides
authority for grants of jurisdiction on the basis of minimal diversity between adverse claimants.”).
Professor Pfander has argued that the restriction of Article III’s grant of diversity jurisdiction to
“controversies . . . between” diverse parties limits “the boldest assertions of minimal diversity” 
that attempt to join nondiverse claims that are “separate and distinct” from diverse claims, but he
recognizes that “[a]rguments about bias . . . do not help much in defining constitutional limits on
the scope of the litigation unit for diversity purposes.” Id. at 1449–51.
 300. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (containing no exclusion for in-state plaintiffs). 
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unconstitutional on bias rationale grounds.301 Nor has the Court 
invalidated any statutory tests for citizenship determination because of 
inconsistency with the bias rationale.302 The upshot is that Congress can
extend diversity jurisdiction regardless of whether bias—or its 
perception—exists.303 As long as the controversy is between citizens of
different states, the Diversity Clause covers it.304 
To be clear, there may be good reasons to resist sweeping 
proposals to expand federal jurisdiction to the reaches of the Diversity 
Clause. Significant policy considerations warrant caution.305 But those 
are questions of policy, not of constitutional limits. Nothing in Article 
III prevents Congress from using the Diversity Clause to consider and 
weigh values unconnected to the bias rationale.
CONCLUSION
This Article is not another piece arguing for or against diversity
jurisdiction. Rather, its point is to try to modernize and update the
conversation about diversity jurisdiction to account for a diminished 
role of the bias rationale and new considerations, including the 
importance of federal aggregation. This Article’s aim is to free diversity 
jurisdiction from its state-bias moorings to enable more honest—and 
more productive—consideration of the salutary scope of federal 
diversity jurisdiction. 
301. To the contrary, the Court has sustained minimal diversity grants under the Diversity
Clause despite the lack of any congressional purpose to protect against state bias. See, e.g., 
Tashire, 386 U.S. at 530 (upholding the Interpleader Act’s grant of minimal diversity jurisdiction,
based on “the legislative purpose broadly to remedy the problems posed by multiple claimants to 
a single fund” under the Diversity Clause). 
302. Indeed, recent citizenship tests have eschewed dependence upon the bias rationale. See
supra notes 287–96 and accompanying text (discussing Hertz). 
303. It is true that the bias rationale has influenced the way Congress has extended, and the
way the Court has construed, statutory grants of diversity jurisdiction. See supra notes 87–107 and 
accompanying text (discussing the complete diversity rule, the statutory designation of corporate
citizenship, and the forum-defendant rule). The bias rationale has not, however, influenced the 
Court’s construction of the Diversity Clause. Cf. Tashire, 386 U.S. at 531 n.7 (tacitly approving
pending proposals to use diversity jurisdiction to promote multiparty and multiforum
aggregation).
304. One scholar has argued that the Diversity Clause restricts the grant of diversity
jurisdiction to instances compatible with the bias rationale. See Floyd, The Limits, supra note 274, 
at 615 (contending that Article III requires that congressional authorization of diversity
jurisdiction must “reasonably . . . serve the purposes underlying Article III’s grant of federal
jurisdiction”). But that has never been the way the Court or Congress sees it.
 305. See supra notes 165–80 and accompanying text.
